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We fell in love with the kimono and stole those geisha hearts 
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Abstract 
 
 
 
This thesis examines the relationships between Australian troops of the British Commonwealth 
Occupation Force (BCOF) and Japanese citizens during the Allied Occupation of Japan 
following World War Two (1945 – 1952). Literature regarding the Allied Occupation of Japan 
largely focuses on the United States and its role in the development of post-war Japan’s politics 
and foreign relations. This extends to social and cultural histories, which focus on the 
fraternisation involving American GIs. The BCOF was, in contrast ‘the forgotten force’. In 
comparison to the United States, the BCOF established strict guidelines towards fraternisation. 
However, this thesis argues that these guidelines did nothing to stop fraternisation with the 
local Japanese population. Using archival evidence, memoirs, media and existing research, this 
thesis analyses and discuss Australian troops and their interactions with Japanese citizens.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
World War II in the Pacific came to an end with the broadcast of Emperor Hirohito’s 
statement of surrender to the Japanese public on August 15, 1945. To ensure the safety of 
Japan’s people the Emperor asked: “How are we to save the millions of our subjects, … [and] 
atone ourselves before the hallowed spirits of our imperial ancestors?”1 He saw surrender as 
the only answer. The Allied Occupation of Japan began almost immediately thereafter. The 
occupation era was a seven-year period in which the United States and its Allies demilitarised 
and democratised Japan.  
Because of the occupation, Japan experienced reforms militarily, politically, and 
economically. Japan became a country without a military system, as the Allied Occupation 
aimed to stop Japan from being a risk to the Pacific. Politically, Japan became a democratic 
state with a new constitution and a government that relinquished the Emperor’s power. The 
San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1952 brought an end to the occupation, at which time Japan was 
allied to the United States. However, this thesis does not aim to focus on military, political and 
economic reforms. Instead, this thesis focuses on the interactions between occupiers and 
occupied.  
Allied Occupation opened pathways to social interactions between the occupiers and the 
occupied. Historian John Dower believed that fraternisation in the occupation “was the starting 
point for interracial affection, mutual respect and even love.”2 Anti-fraternisation has been a 
consistent aspect of military operations for centuries. However, fraternisation thrived during 
the Allied Occupation of Japan. In the streets of Tokyo, it was not uncommon to find American 
GIs with a Japanese girl on their arm.  British troop Jack Morris described Tokyo’s parks as 
                                                     
1 Emperor Hirohito, “Accepting the Potsdam Declaration,” August 14, 1945, Mount Holyoke, Japan, radio 
broadcast, https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/hirohito.htm 
2 John W. Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 
1999), 211. 
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places that, in the dark, “crowded with Allied soldiers and their lovers.”3 When questioned 
about the relaxed fraternisation policy for American GIs, Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme 
Commander of Allied Power (SCAP), stated that he “wouldn’t issue a non-fraternisation order 
for all the tea in China.”4 Despite being controversial, especially with epidemics of venereal 
disease, the overall response to fraternisation by the American occupiers was nonchalant. 
However, the United States was not the only country to occupy Japan.  
The British Commonwealth Occupation Force (BCOF), worked with the United States 
in the occupation from 1946 to its end in 1952. It was a multi-national and multi-ethnic force 
established under the Commonwealth (minus Canada) including Britain, India, New Zealand 
and Australia. At its height, the BCOF counted for nearly one quarter of all occupation troops.5 
The majority of the BCOF troops originated from Australia, with the force under the command 
of an Australian Commander-in-Chief. The first Commander-in-Chief was John Northcott 
(1946) and followed shortly after by Horace Robertson (1946 – 1952). The BCOF’s role in the 
Allied Occupation is perceived in occupation literature as the “The Forgotten Force.”6 While 
located in the Hiroshima prefecture, an area of mostly rural farming land and destroyed cities, 
the BCOF worked under the command of Douglas MacArthur. Their role was to contribute to 
the demilitarisation of Japan and maintain control over Japanese citizens. However, as 
described by Ian Nish, “the BCOF, although small, was not irrelevant to the occupation.”7 
                                                     
3 Mark McLelland, Love, Sex and Democracy in Japan during the American Occupation (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2012), 73. 
4 Sarah Kovner, Occupying Power: Sex Workers and Servicemen in Postwar Japan (California: Stanford 
University Press, 2012), 36. 
5 Eiji Takemae, The Allied Occupation of Japan (New York: The Continuum International Publishing Group, 
2002), xxx. 
6 James Wood, The Forgotten Force: The Australian Military Contribution to the Occupation of Japan, 1945-
1952 (New South Wales: Allen & Unwin, 1998).   
7 Ian Nish, “The Occupation of Japan: Some British Perspectives,” in The East Asian Crisis, 1945-1951: The 
Problem of China, Korea and Japan, ed. Ian Nish (London: London School of Economic and Political Science, 
1982), 69. 
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Located in the Australian War Memorial is a single glass case to describe the role of the 
British Commonwealth Occupation Force. The case displays the uniform of a troop in the 67th 
Infantry Battalion and three photos displayed on the information panel. The first two 
photographs depict troops: one with Robert Menzies and the second of troops preparing to 
move to Japan. The third photograph, however, is of Sargent F. Franklin and Morita Setsuko 
on the day of their wedding.  The BCOF is described as follows: 
In 1946 an Australian-led British Commonwealth Occupation Force arrived in Japan. 
From 1946 to 1951, 16,000 Australians served in Japan, most around Hiroshima. Members 
of the occupation force supervised Japan’s demilitarisation, oversaw elections and 
established the foundations for a return to a democratic government. Though at first 
forbidden to do so, the occupation force established good relations with their former 
enemies, the foundation for Australia and Japan’s reconciliation.8 
To the public of modern day Australia, fraternisation is seen as an integral part of the 
occupation, one highlighted in a glass case which represents the historical event. However, this 
was not always the case. Unlike the United States, where there was leniency on fraternisation, 
fraternisation within the BCOF was forbidden and restricted by firm policies set by John 
Northcott and the BCOF administration. It limited not only romantic and sexual relationships 
but restricted BCOF personnel from even speaking to a Japanese citizen outside of his or her 
work. They were asked as representatives of the Commonwealth to remember that not only the 
Japanese, but the world as a whole, was expecting their best behaviour.  
This thesis explores and examines the disconnect between these anti-fraternisation orders 
and the relationships that developed between the BCOF and the Japanese citizens around 
Hiroshima.  It argues that fraternisation, although banned, was an active component of the lives 
of the BCOF troops. As the BCOF was mainly comprised of Australian troops, this thesis will 
                                                     
8 Quote was taken from a plaque found at the Australian War Memorial, Canberra. 
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focus on how Australians interacted with Japanese citizens. It will analyse the fraternisation 
policy of the BCOF and point out the numerous ways in which the policy was abandoned by 
troops in favour of different forms of fraternisation.  
1.1 THE OCCUPATION OF JAPAN – REVIEWING THE LITERATURE   
Much of occupation history is written from a military-political perspective and explores 
the politics of Japan’s transition from an enemy of the United States to a firm ally. The social 
and cultural aspect of the Allied Occupation had not been of interest until the turn of the 21st 
century. More historians are working to write about the social and cultural aspects of the 
occupation. In addition to this, there is an issue of inclusivity of the BCOF in mainstream 
occupation research. In the past thirty years, the social and cultural aspects of the occupation, 
particularly experienced by the BCOF, have only just begun to receive scholarly attention. 
Leading occupation researcher Eiji Takemae points out that “historians … overlook the role of 
other Allied soldiers in Japan.”9  Similarly, BCOF historian, Peter Bates points out that the 
American tendency to “ignore the British presence of the occupation … persisted even in 
academic circles.” 10  This impacts on what the semantics of Occupation research: many 
historians (particularly American historians) refer to the “American occupation of Japan,” 
while those who include the BCOF (and other Allied contributions) refer to it as the Allied 
Occupation.11 The intention of this thesis is to add illumination to the history of this forgotten 
force, with particular respect to their experience of fraternisation with Japanese citizens.  
There is a growing literature on fraternisation within the occupation. A considerable 
portion of this literature tends to focus on the United States and how American GIs interacted 
and treated the Japanese. Academics such as John Dower, Mark McLelland, Mire Koikari and 
                                                     
9 Takemae, The Allied Occupation of Japan, xxix. 
10 Peter Bates, Japan and the British Commonwealth Occupation Force 1946–52 (London: Brassey’s Ltd., 
1993), ix. 
11 Historians referring to the occupation as the Allied Occupation are: Eiji Takemae, Sarah Kovner, Edwin M. 
Martin, Peter Bates, George Davis, Robin Gerster etc.  
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Sarah Kovner look at the cultural impacts of the occupation. Apart from Dower, each of these 
historians has experience in gender studies and this is apparent in occupation fraternisation 
research. It is important to note that gender studies are therefore directly connected to how 
fraternisation in the occupation impacted Japanese women. 
John Dower is one of the leading academics of occupation research and balances his 
research equally between politics, military and social themes. In his book Embracing Defeat, 
the chapter ‘Cultures of Defeat’ is especially powerful in its discussion of prostitution during 
the occupation.12 However, Dower’s work on the occupation is focused on locations in and 
around urban areas of Japan and particularly in Tokyo, this means that the southern provinces 
where the BCOF operated were not researched in detail. Even within the index page of 
Embracing Defeat, Australia is only mentioned three times in discussions relating to the Allied 
Council on Japan (as opposed to the BCOF). The lack of information about the BCOF in his 
foundation building research allows for new research on the BCOF’s impact on the Japanese 
people to develop.13  
Mark McLelland, a professor of gender and sexuality studies, uses his understanding to 
discuss ideas of male-female sex and romance in the occupation and how this related to the 
goal of democratisation by the United States. McLelland’s work, Love, Sex and Democracy in 
Japan During the American Occupation talks about the evolution of the male-female 
relationship in Japan and how Japanese perceptions of this were impacted and changed thanks 
to the occupation and its democratic influences. McLelland describes the occupation, and 
especially the period from 1945 to 1948 as “a time of sexual anarchy.”14 While discussing the 
evolution of these relationships, he rarely discusses it as a form of fraternisation and only 
                                                     
12 Dower, Embracing Defeat, 127. 
13 Other occupation books by Dower include: Japan in War and Peace (1993), Japan in the Modern World 
(2012) and Empire and Aftermath (1979) 
14 McLelland, Love Sex and Democracy During the American Occupation of Japan, 49. 
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touches on the idea that Occupation administration was trying to limit this behaviour. His 
research also does not focus on the BCOF, as suggested with the title declaring the occupation 
an American Occupation and as there is no mention of Australia or the BCOF in his index.  
Mire Koikari focuses on gender studies within the occupation and discusses the treatment 
of Japanese women. Her article “Rethinking Gender and Power in the US Occupation of Japan, 
1945 – 1952” is a prime example of Koikari’s analysis of gender and its place in the occupation. 
She argues that the combination of gender, race and class had a defining impact on how the 
occupation was run. Specifically, she discusses government run Japanese brothels, sex workers 
and the treatment of Japanese women when the issue of venereal disease became an issue. Her 
findings are also an example of the archival work of many American-focused occupation 
historians who reference the SCAP records and the MacArthur Memorial. 15  However, 
Koikari’s work is strictly focused on the impact of Americans on the Japanese.  
Another academic that adds to the existing literature of Japanese women, specifically sex 
workers, in the occupation is Rumi Sakamoto. Her work discusses specifically the , a group of 
Japanese sex workers who interacted solely with occupation personnel. Sakamoto describes  as 
embodying “complex articulations of interracial desire, material ambition and opportunism, as 
well as victimhood,” and examines this through post-war literary representations. 16  The 
examination of literary texts to discuss the perspectives of fraternisation within the occupation 
is an excellent way of observing emotional responses from creative minds. Yet, once again 
there is no mention of Australia or the BCOF in her work and there is only focus on the 
American division.  
                                                     
15 Mire Koikari, “Rethinking Gender and Power in the US Occupation of Japan, 1945-52,” Gender & History 
11, no. 2 (July 1999): 303–335. 
16 Rumi Sakamoto, “Pan-pan Girls: Humiliating Liberation in Post-war Japanese Literature,” Portal: Journal of 
Multidisciplinary International Studies 7, no. 2 (2010): 1. 
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In the same manner as Koikari and McLelland, Sarah Kovner analyses occupation-era 
fraternisation between occupation troops and female sex workers. As with the two previous 
academics, her work focuses mainly on American GIs.  Despite this Kovner discusses the 
BCOF and its fraternisation with sex workers with sources from Australian archives. Kovner 
begins to analyse the BCOF administration and its control, or lack of control, over 
fraternisation but does not express this for other forms of fraternisation. Overall, Kovner’s work 
on fraternisation tends to focus more on the relationships developed with American GIs. 
Therefore, what she has discussed about the BCOF is limited.17  
While research focused on the United States in Japan has a division between military, 
politics and social experiences, BCOF research consistently intertwines these three aspects. 
Historians outside the United States have contributed greatly to the understanding of the 
BCOF’s experience in Japan. The foundations of BCOF research have been developed on the 
memoirs of former BCOF members, and have then been expanded by BCOF historians. 
Leading historians in the field of BCOF studies are Peter Bates, George Davies, James Wood 
and Robin Gerster. It is important to note that many BCOF historians (specifically Bates and 
Davies) were also part of the BCOF themselves. However, there is a difference in Bates and 
Davies from those who write memoirs as they look at the BCOF’s contribution to the 
occupation from a more critical, academic perspective. In addition to these historians, other 
BCOF historians such as Christine de Matos, Tamura Keiko and Walter Hamilton, emphasise 
the social and cultural experiences of the BCOF.  
The memoirs by those who were part of the BCOF were, for the most part, the first books 
published discussing the BCOF. These books are the foundations of BCOF research and 
discuss the author’s experiences during their time spent in Japan through the occupation. The 
                                                     
17 See Kovner’s discussion of the BCOF on pages 44–67 in Occupying Power. 
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bibliographic list of memoirs includes that of John W. Arthur, Alan Clifton and Phillip M. 
Green. These men all came from the Australian division of the BCOF. They were for the most 
part at an intermediate level of Japanese and worked in positions such as education officers or 
translators. 18 This means that their experiences of Japan have a depth to them that includes 
direct interactions with the Japanese citizens through conversation. Their memoires follow both 
their stories and the experiences of some of their friends with named changed for reasons of 
privacy. Each memoir looks at the interactions between the BCOF and Japanese citizens in one 
way or another. This thesis acknowledges there are perhaps bias connotations to these memoirs. 
Events may or may not have occurred differently to what these men have stated in their 
experience of Japan. However, these are still important texts in perceiving how an Australian-
based BCOF viewed occupation, especially as there is a lack of archived personal collections 
from BCOF troops. These memoirs were then followed by historians and works by 
academically-minded BCOF members.  
Peter Bates was the first former BCOF troop to look academically at the BCOF 
chronologically from its origin up until the end of the BCOF’s time in Japan and beyond. Bates, 
a British Japanese-speaking intelligence officer in the BCOF, focuses on official records and 
interviews with other BCOF members. Bates develops a ground work for the origins of the 
occupation and it is vital to read to understand the goals of the BCOF. Bates has a small chapter 
dedicated to fraternisation in the BCOF. Like other historians who discuss BCOF and 
fraternisation, Bates points out the BCOF authorities’ stern approach to fraternisation in 
comparison to the United States. He also argues that it was inevitable for the BCOF troops and 
the Japanese to befriend one another.19 While this argument follows the same lines as this 
                                                     
18 Nish was part of the British division of the BCOF 
19 Bates, Japan and the British Commonwealth Occupation Force, 117. 
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thesis, the ten pages of information that Bates includes is not enough to discuss the existence 
of fraternisation in the BCOF.  
Following after Bates was James Wood and his book The Forgotten Force which focuses 
on how Australia’s position in the BCOF influenced its relationship in international politics. 
However, even in a book with such emphasis on politics, Wood does see that “in effect the 
BCOF troops were breaking the non-fraternisation rules all the time.”20 He discusses that the 
fraternisation policy was not efficient and discusses the development of the fraternisation 
policy throughout the occupation. While he mentions the issue of venereal disease and black-
market operations, Wood does not discuss the forms of fraternisation themselves in detail and 
tends to remain focused on polices instead of the people.  
George Davies was also part of the BCOF, coming from the New Zealand division, and 
like Bates relies more on primary sources from the time rather than his own experiences. His 
research into the BCOF is in depth, perhaps more detailed than that of Bates, as he discusses 
small details from clothing of troops to dental services.21 Davies also follows the international 
relationships developing and changing through the BCOF. Davies reports on fraternisations 
policy and the fact that the Australian public’s opinions of Japan was the “prime motivation … 
to insist on the enforcement of a strict non-fraternisation policy.”22 Davies, however, does not 
discuss in detail what forms of fraternisation occurred. Davies also discusses black-market 
operations and describes the BCOF’s ways of discouraging BCOF troops engaging with it, 
however he does not align BCOF interactions with black market dealers as a form of 
                                                     
20 Wood, The Forgotten Force, 69. 
21 For discussion of the BCOF lifestyle see George Davies, The Occupation of Japan: The Rhetoric and the 
Reality of Anglo-Australasian Relations 1939–1952 (Queensland: University of Queensland Press, 2001), 115–
227. 
22 Davies, The Occupation of Japan, 176. 
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fraternisation.23 Despite this, Davies also sets the foundations for analysing the life of the 
BCOF troop with an emphasis on the overall impact of the BCOF in Australasian relations.  
Another fundamental piece of literature when researching the BCOF is Robin Gerster’s 
Travels in Atomic Sunshine: Australia and the Occupation of Japan. Gerster’s view of 
fraternisation focuses, as many academics do, on the romantic and sexual relationships with 
the Japanese. Gerster argues that fraternisation took place because “many Australian 
servicemen wanted something more substantial and enduring than the brief, hectic exchange 
of the brothel and back alleys.” 24  Gerster also, like many academics, discusses forms of 
fraternisation such as black marketing but does not entitle them as acts of fraternisation. Gerster 
also examines the issue of crimes committed by the BCOF troops in Japan. His research shows 
that fraternisation could be part of BCOF troops lives as either a positive or negative aspect.  
Moving into more fraternisation-focused research, Christine de Matos focuses on women 
within the occupation, predominantly within the realms of the BCOF. De Matos uniquely has 
written on the women who were employed by the BCOF in her article entitled ‘A Very 
Gendered Occupation: Australian Women as “Conquerors” and “Liberators”.’ However, De 
Matos has not limited herself to the analysis of women, and her article “The Occupiers and the 
Occupied: A Nexus of Memories” the “memories of Australians … wand the Japanese who 
lived under Australian occupation.”25  She also includes the use of novella written about the 
occupation to display how races perceived each other. De Matos’s understanding of the 
occupation as “a space where cross-cultural exchange between Australians and Japanese 
occurred on an unprecedented scale”26 aligns with this thesis’s concepts and arguments relating 
to fraternisation as an important piece of the lives of BCOF troops. Unlike De Matos, who 
                                                     
23 Davies, The Occupation of Japan, 196. 
24 Robin Gerster, Travels in Atomic Sunshine: Australia and the Occupation of Japan (Victoria: Scribe 
Publications, 2008), 213 
25 Christine de Matos, “The Occupiers and the Occupied: A Nexus of Memories,” New Voices 1, (2006): 1. 
26 Ibid., 11. 
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focused on Australian women, this thesis focuses on the stories of Australian men within the 
occupation.  
While marriage between BCOF and Japanese is now displayed as a positive aspect in the 
Australian War Memorial, mixed marriages were forbidden during the occupation. Marriage 
was therefore a form of fraternisation in the BCOF surpassed the occupation and become a 
lifelong commitment. The lives of these war brides have been researched in detail by Keiko 
Tamura, who published Michi’s Memories: The Story of a Japanese War Bride in 2001. While 
the book retells mainly the lives of War Brides after their move to Australia, Tamura does 
discuss in her first chapter the initial relationships with BCOF troops and their soon-to-be 
brides during the occupation. She explains that the “BCOF’s attitude towards the Japanese was 
characteristically more rigid,” and therefore impacted anti-fraternisation policy. 27 What is 
important about Tamura’s research is that researchers are given the ability to understand the 
position of the Japanese women during the occupation and understand why marriage was more 
than just defying fraternisation policies.  Tamura’s research discusses the impact of 
fraternisation, rather than the act itself.  
In the same fashion, Hamilton focuses singularly on what happens post occupation and 
focuses on the orphans of those BCOF men who fathered children with Japanese women. 
Hamilton believed that the occupation served as “a hot house for racial theories.”28 His work, 
while displaying a form of fraternisation, discusses its impact past the occupation and the racial 
undertones of the occupation. A pattern in Tamura and Hamilton’s works is that these focus on 
a single form of fraternisation. Tamura mentions briefly in her introduction the idea of 
                                                     
27 Keiko Tamura, Michi’s Memories: The Story of a Japanese War Bride (ACT: Research School of Pacific and 
Asian Studies, Australian National University, 2001), 4. 
28 Walter Hamilton, Children of the Occupation: Japan’s Untold Story, (NSW: New South Publishing, 2012), 3. 
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fraternisation through the black market and employment, however has not gone into immense 
detail with her research and has focused on war brides instead.   
Apart from work by de Matos, there is a pattern in current occupation research of 
discussing fraternisation in terms of how troops have behaved with specifically Japanese sex 
workers. Fraternisation with sex workers did take up most fraternisation concerns in BCOF 
administration. This thesis aims to expand the discussion of sex worker fraternisation through 
the discussion of venereal disease patterns within the BCOF. However, it is important to note 
that there existed numerous forms of fraternisation. Friendship, employees, business partners 
in the black market and soon-to-be brides are examples. When discussed by historians, these 
forms are either spoken about singularly or are not registered as a form of fraternisation.29 This 
thesis aims to bring these topics together under the singular category of fraternisation, as each 
form contributed to a growing relationship between Australia and Japan through the BCOF 
troops and Japanese citizens. 
This thesis also seeks to offer new insights into the issue of fraternisation between BCOF 
troops and Japanese citizens by examining otherwise under-used primary sources. These are 
found in various locations on Australia’s eastern seaboard. Among the more important archival 
repositories are the State Library of NSW (Sydney), the Australian War Memorial (Canberra), 
the National Archives of Australia (Canberra) and the Victorian Archives Centre 
(Melbourne). 30  In total, there are 1754 records catalogued with the National Archives of 
                                                     
29 This is especially true for BCOF academics who discuss the black market and black-market dealings but do 
not observe it as a form of fraternisation. 
30 Due to the number of sources and the amount of time allocated to the development of this research, there is a 
lot that has not been discovered within these catalogued records. Many pieces are also generically labelled, 
which makes it difficult to do a more precise search throughout the collection. Numerous documents are labelled 
such titles as “British Commonwealth Occupation Force [BCOF] Administration Plans,” which can vary in 
theme from disaster plans, employment history and organisation of phone calls within BCOF head-quarters. 
While this thesis aims to analyse the collection as thoroughly as possible, there is more BCOF documents that 
are still to be unearthed in future research that could benefit this thesis. 
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Australia, with the majority being held at the Australian War Memorial (750), followed by 
Melbourne (423).31  
Outside of the National Archives of Australia, this thesis uses The State Library of NSW 
and its personal collections of the papers of John Northcott, Clemet Govett and Stuart Inder 
and their experiences with the BCOF, which are referenced in this thesis. Most Australian 
newspapers cited reporting on the BCOF within the thesis were found through the Trove data 
base. Throughout the thesis I have displayed an equal approach to both historians of the field, 
memoirs of members in the BCOF and archival sources. 
1.2 OUTLINE 
This thesis comprises of three main chapters. Each chapter shows that fraternisation, 
while banned in theory, was practiced throughout the occupation. 
The first chapter will discuss the origins of the BCOF and Australian’s attitudes towards 
the Japanese, from late 1945 to early 1946. It will pay particular attention to Australian 
perceptions for the occupation, the experiences of participants waiting to occupy Japan and the 
perceptions of not only the Australian troops but the public of Australia and how this impacted 
fraternisation policy and relations with the Japanese.  
The second chapter will focus on initial fraternisation policy, the techniques put in place 
to stop fraternisation by the BCOF administration and prostitution as the main form of 
fraternisation. It will analyse the personal instruction of Commander in Chief, John Northcott, 
which acted as the primary fraternisation policy throughout the occupation and instructed 
Australian troops how to behave during their time there. Following this, there is an analysis of 
techniques developed by the BCOF that aimed to discourage troops from fraternisation and 
                                                     
31 The number of sources in other archives across Australia are as follows: Canberra (354), Adelaide (1), 
Brisbane (139), Darwin (0), Tasmania (1), Perth (2), Sydney (84) 
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will show how these techniques failed to stop fraternisation from occurring. This will then lead 
into the primary form of fraternisation that concerned the BCOF administration which was 
fraternisation of troops with Japanese sex workers, which lead to high instances of venereal 
disease in BCOF ranks. The data concerning venereal disease within the BCOF, especially 
within the Australian sector, showed not only evidence of fraternisation but suggests that 
fraternisation occurred at a consistent rate throughout the occupation.  
The third and final chapter will discuss in detail other types of fraternisation and 
discussions on changing the BCOF fraternisation policy. The two main types of fraternisation 
this chapter will focus on are that of the Japanese black market and mixed race marriage. The 
Japanese black market offered an economic influenced form of fraternisation, while marriage 
between BCOF troops and Japanese women reflected a long-term form of fraternisation that 
would impact the Australia’s perception of Japan at the end of the occupation. Apart from 
marriage and black markets, this chapter will discuss forms of fraternisation that did not receive 
as much attention from BCOF administration or were not reported on outside of memoirs. This 
includes both positive and negative forms of fraternisation, ranging from relationships with 
Japanese employees to the aggressive behaviour of BCOF troops towards Japanese citizens. 
The chapter will then conclude with the 1949 discussion on whether BCOF fraternisation 
policies should be reformed with the development of the occupation in the face of Cold War 
politics.  
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2 THE ORIGIN OF AUSTRALIA IN THE BCOF AND 
ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE JAPANESE 
U.S. occupation troops began arriving in Japan in September 1945, only weeks after 
surrender. The demilitarisation and democratisation of Japan began almost immediately under 
the supervision of 430,000 American GIs.1 Australian troops, on the other hand, would not 
arrive in Japan until early 1946. This was due to the Australian government and their desire to 
maintain an occupation force separate to that of the British Commonwealth, a desire influenced 
by shifting international relationships. However, this desire was not shared by both the British 
Commonwealth and the United States. The politics of the BCOF’s creation pushed the 
deployment of the BCOF as far back as late February 1946. This six-month period of 
complications caused issues for not only the governments involved but for those troops in the 
BCOF. Australians, who volunteered to join the Allied Occupation were kept waiting for their 
deployment, the majority of whom were in temporary camps on Morotai Island, Indonesia. All 
of this was combined with a nearly nation-wide negative perception of the Japanese from 
Australia, reflected in the media at the time. The poorly organised beginning to the BCOF, the 
morally frustrating situation for BCOF troops, and the hatred of the Japanese by Australia were 
all aspects that drew John Northcott to the conception of his anti-fraternisation policy and 
personal instruction, thus establishing the baseline for this thesis.  
This chapter will discuss the months that led to Australia’s entry into the occupation in 
three parts: origins, initial troops and perceptions of Japan. It will first discuss the Australian 
government’s decisions regarding their participation in the BCOF. The chapter will then 
examine the first BCOF Australian troops and their situations leading up to deployment. 
Finally, this chapter will look at the troops’, as well as the greater Australian public’s, opinions 
                                                     
1 Keiko Tamura, Michi’s Memories: The Story of a Japanese War Bride (ACT: Research School of Pacific and 
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of Japan and the Japanese citizens. The Australian view of Japanese people influenced the 
fraternisation policies that the first Commander-in-Chief, John Northcott, put in place to restrict 
Australian-Japanese unsupervised interaction. By looking at these three aspects, we will 
examine Australia’s initial attitude towards the Japanese, as well as the Japanese people’s 
attitude towards the Australians, therefore, subsequently influencing the development of the 
BCOF’s anti-fraternisation policies.  
2.1 AUSTRALIA’S ORIGINS IN THE BCOF 
Before Emperor Hirohito’s surrender announcement, the Allied forces had already 
anticipated victory. Following the United States President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s policy of 
‘unconditional surrender,’ the Allies anticipated there would be a military occupation of Japan 
following Japan’s surrender. This was confirmed by the Potsdam Declaration, issued on July 
26, 1945 by the United States, Britain and China. The Declaration stated that “until there is 
convincing proof that Japan’s war-making power is destroyed, points in Japanese territory to 
be designated by the Allies shall be occupied to secure the achievement of the basic objectives 
we are here setting forth”2. At this time, there was no discussion of Australia being part of the 
Allied forces expected to occupy Japan. In Australian newspapers such as Truth (NSW) and 
The Telegraph (QLD) there was only discussion of the occupation as a solely American 
operation and that Britain, Russia and China would play a role in the surrender.3 As suggested 
in the Daily News on the August 11 1945, “it was stated that there is no indication of whether 
an Australian force will be included among troops of the Occupation”4 and that it was expected 
Australians would only supervise those Japanese forces still within Australian territory.  
                                                     
2 Chiang Kai-shek, Harry S. Truman and Winston Churchill. “Terms for Japanese Surrender.” July 26, 1945. 
Library of Congress. https://www.loc.gov/law/help/us-treaties/bevans/m-ust000003-1204.pdf  
3 These newspapers are from specifically the 11th and 12th of August 1945. 
4 “Australians Await MacArthur’s Orders,” The Daily News, August 11, 1945. 
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Australian participation in the BCOF only took place after a lengthy process of trying to 
secure an independent Australian occupation force with no input from the Commonwealth.  
Australia aimed to have its own occupation force separate from the Britain. Australia had 
fought the Japanese since 1941 with only minimal assistance from Britain and wished to reflect 
this independence following the war by overseeing a separate occupying force. The next 
motivation behind having an independent occupation force was that Australia aimed to develop 
stronger international relations with the United States, which had emerged from World War II 
in a favourable position compared to Britain. These two influences ultimately led to the slow, 
confusing, and unorganised preparations for deploying the BCOF. 
World War II brought an end to the British Empire’s global supremacy. The war had 
impacted the British economy through the depletion of resources and death of a large 
proportion of the work force, as well as affecting Britain’s relations within Europe. The United 
States, on the other hand, had an economic boom and was in a position of political and military 
strength across the world stage. According to historian Walter Lafeber, the post-war 
international economy was based on the Bretton Woods framework, established by the US 
government, which played a central role by providing crucial funds to many major countries 
involved in World War II. By 1945, the US was one of the few countries that still held financial 
reserves, “thus if the British, French or Japanese wished to reconstruct their societies they had 
to accept U.S principles.”5 This combination of economic and military strength put the US in 
a position of power at the end of World War II and made the United States a more favourable 
ally to Australia when compared with to Britain.  
During World War II, Australia had grown close to the United States. Their similarities 
and collaborative wartime practices in the Pacific sphere made this as an opportunity for 
                                                     
5 Walter LaFeber, The Clash: U.S–Japanese Relations Throughout History (New York: Norton, 1998), 259. 
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Australia to move away from the failing British Empire and instead secure itself by means of 
a new relationship with the United States. Historian Joseph Siracusa wrote that “nothing could 
be more natural than a close relationship between these two, continental, British-begotten, 
frontier-shaped, Pacific Powers.”6 The presence of the United States within the Pacific sphere 
brought relief to Australian forces. Australians had realised that Japan’s mastery of air warfare 
left Australia vulnerable to attack at any point on its mostly costal populations. There was also 
a lot of Australian civilian interaction with American GIs, causing a relationship with the 
United States past militant activities. During December 1941 to late 1942, Australia was home 
to American soldiers, including at one point the future commander of Japan’s occupation, 
General Douglas MacArthur. The Age, an Australian newspaper, pointed out that some of 
MacArthur’s successful strategies during World War II were based on watching Australians in 
the Pacific War.7 The newspaper continued in a vein that seemed designed to appeal to the 
vainglorious “General MacArthur is assured,” it editorialised, “of an honoured place in the 
history of the World War of 1939 – 45”.8 Without knowing they were going to be in the 
occupation, and therefore without intention of an end goal, the article from early August 
exemplifies Australia’s admiration for MacArthur at the conclusion of World War II. 
The presence of the United States in the Pacific emphasised a shift in Australia’s trust 
from one major nation, Britain, to another, the United States.9 In a letter to US President 
Franklin Roosevelt in October 1942, American Ambassador Nelson Johnson observed that 
Australians were realising “the old security from attack through membership in the Empire was 
gone.”10 Britain was unable to protect Australia. The Sydney Morning Herald (NSW) wrote 
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that “experience has shown us that danger comes in the Pacific when British military power is 
absorbed by war in Europe. We had to look to our mighty neighbour, the United States, for 
rescue when the Japanese tide rolled southward, and gratefully indeed we recall her aid.”11 
This shift in public opinions, as evidenced through newspaper articles, marked the start of 
Australia’s move to form a stronger alliance with the US. 
In an act to show their emerging relations with the United States and their display new-
found sense of independence from Britain, Australia directly asked the United States for 
permission to take part in the surrender ceremony in Tokyo Bay. Australia’s Foreign Minister 
Herbert V. Evatt believed that it would be ‘unthinkable’ to have Australia not to attend the 
event, especially since Australia “contributed proportionately more with bases, works, supplies 
and fighting men to bring about the present happy development than any of the Big Four.”12 
Douglas MacArthur allowed an Australian naval squadron to represent Australia as army and 
air force could not be moved in time for the ceremony. Newspapers such as the Sydney Morning 
Herald (NSW) covered this with language that emphasised gratitude towards the United States 
and MacArthur. It was also in newspapers such as this that the government started to announce 
its hopes of providing allied forces for the occupation.13  
In hopes to argue Australia’s position, Evatt penned a memo of nearly 2,000 words for 
the United States which reviewed Australia’s war efforts in detail. The memo, as summarised 
in a telegram to the Secretary of State, recalled the cooperation of Australian and US forces 
“who for three years fought almost alone against [the] Japanese”14. It discussed Australia’s 
displeasure in not being considered for suggestions regarding the Potsdam Declaration. In the 
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document’s conclusion, the Australian government asked for the support of the United States 
government. Specifically support regarding inclusion in the signing of the surrender, a place as 
a principal in the Allied Control Council for Japan and most importantly “that Australian forces 
forming part of the occupation in Japan should be accepted and regarded as independently 
designated Australian forces subordinate only to the Supreme Command.”15 The Australian 
government saw the occupation of Japan as its opportunity to demonstrate to the world that it 
was capable of working as an independent state.  
Despite the Australian government’s new-found confidence with the argument that their 
occupation force should remain independent, there was concern from other allies on this 
decision.  While Australia had successfully bypassed the Commonwealth in order to attend the 
surrender ceremony in Tokyo, the United States viewed Australia’s single-minded attitude as 
worrisome.16 The United States seemed to agree that “a state of strained relations between 
Australia and the Britain … at this time of all times was most undesirable.”17 While Australia 
saw the end of World War II as the playing field needed to change their international position 
and the dynamics of their political relationships, the British Commonwealth and the United 
States saw it as a time to stand together in union as a democratic allied network.  
To appease Australia, the Britain offered Australia a generous position within the 
proposed BCOF. On September 1, 1945, British Prime Minister Clement Attlee sent a 
cablegram to his Australian counterpart, Ben Chifley. In it, Attlee put forward the idea that an 
occupation force of a larger size “under the command of a single senior officer … would carry 
much more weight with the United States … than two commanders of lower rank in command 
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of smaller forces.”18 If Australia agreed to join the BCOF, Britain would offer an Australian 
officer this important position in the force and with this Australia would also provide the bulk 
of the headquarters staff.19 Chifley declined on September 10. Despite the push from the United 
States and Britain that emphasised it was better for Australia to be part of the occupation by 
being part of the BCOF, the Australian government was determined to be independent.  
After rejecting Britain’s offer and continuing its aim of being an independent force, 
Australia turned to General Douglas MacArthur. MacArthur was handed the title of Supreme 
Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) at the beginning of the occupation. As Supreme 
Commander, MacArthur had the ability to “issue all orders for the implementation of the Terms 
of Surrender, occupation, and control of Japan … [where] his decisions upon these matters 
shall be controlling.”20 Australia realised that MacArthur would be their best hope in having 
an independent occupation force due to both his prominent position of power and his close 
relationship with Australia during World War II. Ben Chifley and Herbert V. Evatt emphasised 
a view of Macarthur as their best hope for an Australian occupation force. As early as August 
18, 1945, Evatt asked General Sir Thomas Blamey to “convey to MacArthur expression of our 
hope that … he will once again safeguard the legitimate interests of our country which already 
owes so much to him.”21 This showed Australians had faith that MacArthur would stand with 
them to be a separate force in the occupation. This reference to support was repeated later in 
the correspondence from Chifley to Attlee regarding declining the BCOF offer. Chifley refused 
proposals put forward by the British saying “although no final arrangements have been made, 
we have no doubt that General MacArthur will co-operate fully with us in allotting to the 
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Australian Force a role appropriate to our status and the contribution which we have made to 
the victory in the Pacific.”22 However, despite this faith and loyalty towards MacArthur, the 
United States believed the formation of a British Commonwealth force was more suitable than 
Australia’s desired independent force.  
It was after the cablegram to Attlee on September 10 that the Britain prepared to continue 
the British Commonwealth Occupation Force without Australia and, instead, it would only 
consist of British, Indian and New Zealand troops.23 However, only four days after declining, 
Attlee spoke to Evatt while Evatt was on a trip to England and asked him to reconsider their 
proposal. In a following cablegram to Chifley on September 14, Evatt suggested another point 
of view to Chifley that would demonstrate their independence in the form of authority as it 
“might be possible to use the occasion to demonstrate Australian leadership in Pacific affairs 
and Pacific settlement.”24 It was by Evatt’s persuasion that Chifley decided to accept the 
Britain’s terms and join the British Commonwealth Occupation Force. 25  Chifley sent a 
confirmation message to MacArthur from Canberra on September 21, 1945 confirming that 
while Australia had originally requested an individual place in the occupation of Japan, it would 
now accept the British offer to participate in the occupation as the Australian component of the 
BCOF.26 
MacArthur and Northcott agreed on the principles governing the BCOF’s role in the 
occupation on December 18, 1945. The MacArthur-Northcott agreement then established the 
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basis of the BCOF’s position in the occupation. The BCOF would take over military control in 
the Hiroshima Prefecture, subject to expansion. The agreement states that “demilitarization and 
disposition of Japanese installations and armaments”27 was the BCOF’s main goal, which 
would be achieved under MacArthur’s overall command as SCAP. The Australian Government 
would act as the representative of the British Commonwealth and be the channel of 
communication regarding policy and operations. This position of power gave Australia a sense 
of leadership, while still maintaining a united post-World War II Allied front.  
In addition to the MacArthur-Northcott Agreement, Australia and the other Allied 
powers were to follow the U.S Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan. The document, 
published on September 21, 1945 had two goals for the occupation. The first goal being “to 
ensure that Japan will not again become a menace to the United States or … the world,”28 and 
secondly to establish “a peaceful and responsible government”29 which “should conform as 
closely as may be to principles of democratic self-government.”30 These goals were to be 
achieved by disarming and demilitarization, the encouragement of “a desire for individual 
liberties”31, reforming Japan’s economy and limiting its sovereignty to the islands of Honshu, 
Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and minor outlying islands. By joining the occupation force, the 
BCOF agreed to uphold these orders that would be implemented by the SCAP and shape 
specific BCOF policies. 
Throughout this process of negotiating Australia’s place in the occupation, little 
information was disseminated to the public. This lack of communication to the public left many 
in confusion as to whether Australia held a position in the occupation or not. Newspapers from 
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late 1945 and early 1946 suggest this. As an example, Queensland’s Morning Bulletin 
published “Military Occupation of Japan for Five Years?” on January 1, 1946. It wrote 
Australian troops would be army officers for the “first five years” of the occupation “and for 
the rest of their lives … be civil admins on behalf of the UN.”32 However, twenty nine days 
later on January 30 the Warwick Daily News published “Japanese Occupation Force” where a 
full statement of BCOF plans was expected within a day or two and that the “expected operation 
length is one year.”33 This gap of time and difference in information reflected that negotiations 
were poorly disseminated to the public, and the public was removed from the process. On top 
of complications within the Australian government, the issue of public confusion and 
uneducated opinions would make matters more contentious for Australia.  
The title “British Commonwealth Occupation Force” was not officially made public to 
Australians until January 1946. 34 After four months of stubborn negotiations and lengthy 
preparations, Australia had taken its place as leader of the BCOF and was now prepared to 
bring its troops to Japan.  
2.2 PARTICIPANTS OF THE BCOF 
After the confirmation of Australia joining the BCOF, the next phase was to collect 
Australian troops and prepare them for their mission. Much like the political organisation of 
participating in the force, Australian troops found the experience leading up to entering Japan 
to be drawn out and unorganised. This specifically affected the Australian troops on the island 
of Morotai, Indonesia, as they experienced up to six months of waiting for deployment. The 
overall process led to the development of a negative perception of the occupation expressed by 
Australian troops and reflected in Australian media.   
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Australia developed entirely new troop units for the BCOF from those who volunteered 
throughout numerous areas of the Australian military. As conscription had been abolished 
within Australia for services overseas, the government was to rely on soldiers still in active 
duty to volunteer for the job or those who had just finished their service.35 It was from this 
volunteer program that the 34th Australian Infantry Brigade was developed. When it was 
discovered that Australia planned to join the occupation, there was an initial influx of 
volunteers into the BCOF program. In the 66th Battalion there were 120 volunteers to fill the 
34 positions. These troops, in Bates’s words were “single, had some time to go before they 
could expect to be discharged, and wanted to see more of the world.”36 The BCOF’s Australian 
demographic at the start of the occupation reflected a group of young men who were likely to 
fraternise with Japanese citizens, despite their instructions. 
Most occupation troops were members of the newly created 34th Brigade, who suffered 
firsthand the slow organisation of the BCOF from Morotai Island, after being moved there in 
order to wait for the occupation to begin. Many of these men expected to remain in Morotai for 
only two to three weeks, but instead remained on the island for almost four months from 
October 1945 to February 1946 while waiting for approval to continue to Japan. During the 
four months, the troops suffered through the humid weather and insect-borne illnesses such as 
malaria.  However, the biggest problem for the troops on Morotai was the lack of entertainment 
and the unavoidable boredom that came with it. This greatly affected the morale of the troops 
and their outlook on the task ahead. As recorded in Bates’ book on the BCOF, “it was not easy 
to maintain the initial burst of enthusiasm with which everyone had embarked on.”37 Major-
General B McDonald, in correspondence with Bates, stated that this lack of entertainment for 
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the Brigade led to the constant routine of practicing drills and parades until they had achieved 
perfection, where they “even polished the inside of the metal buckles on (our) chinstraps.”38 
As the weeks passed, numerous troops withdrew from the force which brought the brigade 
man-power down to just over 2000 troops. This sudden withdrawal of troops meant that the 
government pushed for more volunteers to join the program, which in turn brought media 
attention to Morotai and the 34th Brigade from Australia.  
The brigade was given media attention in Australia, specifically for the lack of morale. 
There were numerous newspaper articles discussing the treatment of these soldiers and 
normally shared the same theme to their titles: “Men for Japan Discouraged and Impatient”, 
“A.I.F. Jap Occupation Force Sends Protest” and “Wait at Morotai.”39  Two newspaper articles 
wrote, in detail, on the conditions of the 34th Brigade during their time there. “Men for Japan 
Discouraged and Impatient” from The Courier Mail spoke of how troops had been issued 
inappropriate uniforms. Despite being described as ‘Australia’s best dressed’ the troops were 
issued uniforms that had “three distinct shades, three distinct cloth qualities and two distinct 
types.”40 Perhaps the more startling part of the attire given to the troops were the overcoats 
“with many showing signs of stripes and the colour patches of their former owners.”41 The men 
were also discouraged by a “lack of recognition in official quarters”42 from the government. 
The article concludes with the troops hoping for less misunderstanding by the public of their 
task and more official understanding of their requirements, with the need to be kept informed 
of the progress in their move to Japan. Some soldiers, specifically from the 67th Battalion, went 
above their higher offers to send protests to Chifley – as reported in “A.I.F. Jap Operation Force 
Sends Protest” written by The Sun. Their public protest, addressed to the Prime Minister, 
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discussed that applications to withdraw from the BCOF had been refused at first and “the 
soldiers who volunteered for Japan now felt they were conscripts.”43 The letter to Chifley 
recorded their conditions, which included poor amenities, refusal of compassionate leave and 
promises unkept. Men who had volunteered to serve for twelve months in Japan, officially 
commencing on their arrival in Japan, would now not see their friends or families for an 
extended period of time. This framing of the BCOF soldiers on Morotai influenced the 
Australian public’s understanding of the occupation troops by representing them as the 
forgotten soldier.  
The fact that the 34th Brigade on Morotai were the first participants of the BCOF to step 
foot in Japan builds an argument as to why Northcott decided to write about fraternisation in 
his personal address to the troops in the front page of the Know Japan booklet. After waiting 
for so long, the troops on Morotai could start their move to Japan in February and were later 
joined by those in Australia in March. Because of the poor organisation of the BCOF the 
participants, who had volunteered and were actively waiting for their duty to begin, suffered as 
a result. Negative emotions and unsettled behaviour in these troops would have strongly 
influenced the initial attitude towards Japan and the Japanese people. 
2.3 AUSTRALIAN PERCEPTIONS OF JAPAN AND THE JAPANESE 
Influences that drew Northcott to make a personal address on fraternisation was reflective 
of Allied perceptions of Japan and the Japanese. It was because Australian public perception 
and interactions during World War II that fraternization rules were as strict as they were for 
the BCOF. Australian troops and the Australian public saw the Japanese as an enemy, even 
after the war as suggested in the newspapers of the time. Japan, as seen by Australia, had 
“thought to ride the wave of conquest with Hitler’s Germany” and their position was a “brief 
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and bloody career as a front-rank power.”44 As a result of interactions with the Japanese during 
World War II, Australians could only perceive the Japanese in a negative light. However, this 
was not one-sided as the Japanese government also had their perceptions of the Australians. 
There was a heightened worry of misconduct by Australians and a sense of fear among the 
Japanese. As Australia was in a position of representation for the Commonwealth, Northcott 
took serious measures to ensure that there would be as few unauthorised interactions between 
the Japanese population and Australian troops as possible, this helped influence the BCOF’s 
strict anti-fraternisation policy. 
The BCOF consisted of soldiers that were not unfamiliar with the Japanese. Australian 
and Japanese troops met face to face in many battles and combat engagements from World War 
II. This included the difficult battles in New Guinea such as the famous Kokoda trail. The trail, 
once simply described by E.G Keogh as a “footpath … used by barefoot natives or an 
occasional missionary,”45 became the sight of a warzone between Australia and Japan from 
July to November 1942 of the same year. The Australian public was also aware of Japanese 
cruelty and crimes committed during the war. They were well informed about the Thai-Burma 
Railway and the treatment of Prisoners of War by the Japanese.46 The railway, built under 
Japanese supervision by 60,000 allied prisoners of war, caused extreme trauma to those who 
had been a part of it, with over 12,000 allied prisoners dying in the process.47  
In addition to these events across the ocean the Bombing of Darwin made Japan the first 
nation to commit an airstrike on Australian soil, in turn making Japan Australia’s number one 
threat to security. Many Australians looked at the Bombing of Darwin on February 19, 1942 
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as Japan’s attempt to invade the Australian continent. Japanese planes bombed both Darwin, 
located in the Northern Territory, and Broome in Western Australia. The attack resulted in 
hundreds of deaths, both military and civilian, and rendered Darwin ineffective as a naval base 
with twenty-one ships destroyed.48 Today, the Bombing of Darwin is still the largest single 
attack on Australia by a foreign power and these air raids strongly impacted the Australian 
perception of Japan. This introduction to Japanese forces and war tactics framed the Japanese 
as potential ruthless invaders within the minds of the Australian public.  These are perhaps the 
most influential moments that have moulded Australia’s perception of Japan and the Japanese. 
Due to their severity, it is only obvious that perceptions are overly negative.49  
Meanwhile with the introduction of the BCOF to the occupation, newspapers kept the 
Australians up to date on BCOF expectations for troops. Media coverage displayed Australian 
public opinion of the Japanese at the beginning of the occupation and expressed this through 
their use of descriptive language. R.J. Gilmore wrote “Man Sized Job Awaits Australia in 
Japan” for The Sun in early February of 1946. The article was meant to educate the public on 
the troop’s expectations when arriving. He describes Hiroshima as “a frozen dump without 
shops, dance halls or sports fields” where “boredom rather than the cold will be the troops’ 
main headache.”50 As shown earlier with the 34th Brigade’s experiences on Morotai, there is a 
sense of regret, bordering on frustration from troops and media on the slow and unorganised 
handling of the occupation forces. The article also describes the Japanese that occupy the area 
around Hiroshima to be “the Jap equivalent of Vikings.”51 Japan and its population were 
described as ‘the Problem Child of the Pacific,’ Gilmore states that the citizens of the 
Hiroshima area are “expected to be among the toughest of problem children.”52 This type of 
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descriptive language continues elsewhere in post war descriptions of Japan. A booklet titled 
BCOF Bound was given to the wives of BCOF troops who were making the trip to Japan to 
join their husbands. This source showed the same colourful style of language in describing the 
Japanese, however, this time it was published and distributed by the Australian government. 
The Australian government described the Japanese in this booklet has having two sides to their 
persona. One was “renowned for his politeness and courtesy.” 53  The other “changed, 
apparently overnight, into a sadistic monkey, delighting in the torture and murder of helpless 
people.”54 This descriptive language in BCOF Bound is a key example of how the Australian 
government perceived the Japanese, and felt confident to share these opinions with the public. 
These terms shared the likeness of the term yellow peril, a term used to describe the Japanese 
and other ethnicities from the Asian continent. This suggests that not only did Australians 
regard the Japanese as their enemy in terms of military threat, but also viewed them poorly as 
a race.  
The Japanese government also had its own expectations of the occupying forces. One 
specific article published by The Telegraph specifically states that “Japs are afraid of AIF 
Men”55. This article described was an expectation by the Japanese that Australian troops would 
show violence and rough treatment during their duty as occupants. Tsuneo Hattori, the Japanese 
government liaison to the BCOF, reported that Japanese officials were apprehensive about the 
Australian involvement as propaganda and gossip in Japan depicted Australian soldiers as men 
“of giant physique, ferocious and brutal.”56 This image of Australian soldiers worried the 
Japanese for fear of post-war retaliation, as well as violence towards women. These perceptions 
continued with early BCOF members who, when compared to American occupying troops, 
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were “frigid and unfriendly.”57 Although Northcott strongly discouraged fraternisation with 
the Japanese, Hattori argued that fraternisation was needed to establish positive relations. 
As Keiko Tamura discusses in her book on Japanese War Brides, Japan’s own 
suggestions against fraternising with allied occupation troops displayed that there was a sense 
of fear from the Japanese. Initially, America occupied Kure for four months until the BCOF 
arrival. It was during these months that Japanese administrators set guidelines for citizens that 
specifically discouraged socialising with occupying forces due to fears of troops responding 
with violence.58 This included remaining silent, as trying to communicate in English may cause 
problems through miscommunication. Guidelines aimed at protecting women from occupying 
troops depicted how women should dress, stating they were not allowed to expose their skin, 
feet or breasts. Women, as well as children, were also not allowed to stare, laugh or wave at 
occupation soldiers.59 The Japanese government around Kure also issued cards for citizens to 
give to occupation soldiers if they showed up at someone’s door. This card addressed the troops 
with “the order of the general headquarters of the Allied Forces states that all negotiations 
regarding buildings, houses, automobiles etc. should be done through the central liaison office 
and not directly by private individuals.”60 The card is an example of how the average Japanese 
feared occupation troops, and this fear did not subside when Australian troops arrived. 
The attitude of Australians towards the Japanese was negative, and hostile in nature. This 
had been directly influenced by their relations during World War II which included battles, the 
treatment of POW and Japan’s attack on Darwin. While the Australian government wished to 
participate in the occupation, therefore establishing their ability to lead in the Pacific, they 
understood rules would need to be implemented for the BCOF to operate without hostile 
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complications between troops and citizens. John Northcott was directly influenced by 
Australian attitudes towards Japan in his development of anti-fraternisation policies for the 
BCOF.  
2.4 CONCLUSION 
It is vital to recognize what prefaced the BCOF’s time in Japan to understand how 
fraternisation developed in the BCOF. Australia’s desire to have an independent occupation 
force from the British Commonwealth slowed the process of the BCOF for six months. This, 
in turn, impacted Australian troops stationed on Morotai Island and decreased morale. As the 
Australian media paid close attention to the forgotten soldiers on Morotai, the Australian public 
reacted negatively to the Allied Occupation. This negative attitude was spurred on by the 
overall Australian attitude towards Japan and the Japanese, influenced by experiences during 
World War II. However, this is only the beginning in understanding and explaining 
fraternisation within the occupation. The idea of fraternisation with the Japanese, which had 
been somewhat accepted within the American division, was perceived as a bad idea by BCOF 
Administration. To maintain peace, Northcott would develop his personal instruction, acting 
as a strict anti-fraternisation policy.  
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3 THE INITIAL POLICY AND  
The Australian perceptions of the Japanese were only the tip of the iceberg of Northcott’s 
concerns regarding fraternisation during the occupation. By entering the occupation in March 
1946, Northcott and the BCOF could see what had been happening to the American component 
of the occupation forces with respect to fraternisation. They observed a lack of initial 
fraternisation policies, which drastically changed with an epidemic of venereal disease in 
American troops due to their interactions with Japanese sex workers known as . The  were a 
group of Japanese sex workers who sold their services to occupation troops and foreigners who 
are considered as “an icon of the occupation” by academics.1 Thanks to this epidemic it was 
believed that “any good girl was safe with an American soldier, whereas a good soldier is not 
safe with a girl.” 2 This caused Australia to adjust their anti-fraternisation policy to avoid the 
issues that had affected the American GIs. As the BCOF arrived in Japan, areas were placed 
out of bounds aimed to limit fraternisation. However, personal accounts and government 
reports regarding fraternisation, as well as the number of Australian troops that contracted 
venereal disease, give evidence that the BCOF anti-fraternisation policy, despite its supposed 
strictness, was neither regulated nor followed by the majority.  
This chapter analyses the initial BCOF anti-fraternisation policy and discusses the main 
form of fraternisation with the Japanese. It will first analyse the personal instruction from John 
Northcott within the first pages of the booklet, Know Japan. This instruction acted as the 
BCOF’s anti-fraternisation policy for the BCOF which outlined the expectations on behaviour 
and conduct. The chapter then discusses what strategies the BCOF put in place to discourage 
fraternisation. However, from government reports and personal recounts the success rate of 
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these strategies shows the latter. From these strategies, the chapter will discuss sexual 
fraternisation as a main form of fraternisation. It will discuss initial sexual fraternisation with 
American GIs and then their Australian counterparts.  Finally, the chapter will discuss the 
epidemic of venereal disease in the BCOF. The startling number of Australian troops with 
venereal disease, recorded at a high number throughout the occupation, suggests that the anti-
fraternisation policy failed to work and were present throughout the Allied Occupation at a 
consistent rate.   
3.1 THE PERSONAL INSTRUCTION 
When Northcott was asked about fraternisation at a press conference in Radio Tokyo, he 
responded as not having a specific non-fraternisation order. However, he would “’discourage’ 
his men through ‘instruction.’” 3  Within the initial documents entitled Plan for a British 
Commonwealth Force to Participate in the Occupation of Japan published May 15, 1946, there 
was only one sentence under the subheading for fraternization. The sentence explained that “a 
personal instruction about fraternisation has already been issued by C in C, BCOF.”4 This 
refers to the personal instructions from John Northcott, written on March 2, 1946, to all ranks 
of the BCOF that was published within the first pages of the booklet Know Japan, a guide to 
Japan for the BCOF troops that aimed to educate and inform. As stated in later documents 
discussing fraternisation policy, it acted as the BCOF’s only instructions regarding 
fraternisation for most of the occupation.  
Know Japan was produced in early 1946 before Australian troops first arrived in Japan. 
It included information about Japan’s geographical features, climate, flora, fauna, agriculture 
and views on Japanese social life. Know Japan was also a BCOF troop’s reminder of anti-
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fraternisation rules. As the personal instruction from Northcott is cited in initial plans for the 
BCOF, it is important to look at the instruction in some detail. The instruction was endorsed 
by numerous government officials across the counties included in the BCOF. The booklet 
begins with a forward by Northcott, discussing Know Japan and its importance for troops. The 
foreword emphasises that “although we may not like the Japanese people, we must learn 
something of their history and customs, so that we can help them to make themselves fit to take 
their place alongside the other peoples of the civilized world.”5 This statement follows the same 
stream of thought behind the U.S Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan that discussed Japan 
conforming to a democratic self-government. By doing this, it is shown that Know Japan and 
the BCOF system are following the guidelines of the SCAP and implementing the same phrases 
and terms into their documentation.  
The first thing to take note of in the personal anti-fraternisation instruction is its 
placement in the booklet itself. It is the first piece of content in the booklet’s ninety-six pages 
after the foreword by Northcott, showing that it was an important piece of the book. It 
emphasised a limit on the troops to how they can interact and use the information in Know 
Japan to understand and interact with the Japanese people. The instruction has two parts to it 
– the first being a small statement from Northcott about fraternisation and the second BCOF 
policy. Northcott small statement is as follows: “Fraternization is one of the most difficult 
problems with which we shall all be faced. I consider that it is quite impracticable to issue 
stringent orders defining what is to be done in an infinite variety of possible contingencies.”6 
It was, in other words, regarded as impractical to develop an official administrative anti-
fraternisation policy to cover the endless situations that could be considered as forms of 
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fraternisation. This helps to explain why there was no further instructions or policy developed 
past the personal instruction regarding fraternisation.  
The second part of the personal instruction can be classified as the policy’s rules. 
Northcott emphasises throughout this second part that the troop or troops are to keep in mind 
that they are part of something bigger than themselves, “he is not only a sailor, a soldier or an 
airman. He is also a representative of the British Commonwealth of Nations and all that this 
stands for in the world.”7 Northcott uses this kind of language throughout the instruction to 
encourage troops to think of themselves as Commonwealth representatives, implying a greater 
sense of responsibility. Instead of using his position of power to make commands in the 
personal instruction, Northcott uses the concept of an imagined community based on national 
identity to connect with the troops.8 Northcott explains his anti-fraternisation policy as “in 
dealing with the Japanese he is dealing with a conquered enemy … Your relations with this 
defeated enemy must be guided largely by your own individual good judgement and your sense 
of discipline.”9 This tells troops that they will be trusted to understand and uphold Northcott’s 
non-fraternisation standards.  
There is a total of four defined rules within the personal instruction. The first is “you 
must be formal and correct.”10 This idea of formality falls back upon Northcott’s emphasis on 
the fact that the BCOF troops are an example of the Commonwealth. As explained in the last 
chapter, Australia was using the BCOF to display their ability to be leaders within the Pacific 
arena. Therefore, their behaviour must reflect that Australian troops were well behaved and 
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unlikely to get themselves in trouble with acts such as fraternization like the American 
occupation troops already had. Northcott in the later part of the instruction, places emphasis on 
this again by saying “that the eyes of the Japanese and of our Allies and, indeed, of the world 
will be watching you.”11 The second rule is that “you must not enter their homes or take part 
in their family life.” This rule would aim to limit and control potential hostile situations from 
occurring between occupation troops and Japanese civilians.  
The third and fourth rules of the instruction work together. The third states that “your 
unofficial dealings with the Japanese must be kept to a minimum,”12 while the fourth explains 
that “you must obey strictly all instructions regarding establishments or areas which are placed 
out of bounds to personnel forming part of the BCOF.” 13 Unofficial interaction with the 
Japanese at this point of the Allied Occupation was mostly with Japanese sex workers. After 
the issue of venereal disease and fraternisation seen with the American troops, Northcott and 
the BCOF administration were aware of the impacts on their troops if a flexible policy on 
fraternisation were allowed. 
3.2 THE ATTEMPTS TO LIMIT FRATERNISATION  
The personal instruction from Northcott was handed to each troop that came to Japan, 
making each soldier aware of their position and how they were meant to deal with the Japanese 
citizens during their time there. However, the BCOF administration searched for ways to stop 
fraternisation from enticing the troops.  The BCOF used numerous techniques, such as access 
to amenities and the presence of family members in Japan to limit fraternisation. These 
attempts, while plausible in theory, were difficult to conduct or simply ineffective. To avoid 
negative public opinion, Northcott reassured the Australian public that their troops were 
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unlikely to fraternise. However, official government documents and eyewitness accounts 
showed otherwise.  
An argument put forth by Northcott was that the BCOF were less likely to be able to 
fraternise as, compared to the American component, the BCOF occupied a less populated area. 
Americans “occupied the more westernised and commercialised cities of Japan”14 while “there 
were comparatively few civilians in the Kure area.”15 This, however, can be argued when 
looking at the recount of BCOF troops and employment history of Japanese civilians at Kure’s 
headquarters. Prior to April of 1946, over 7,000 passes were given to Japanese citizens, now 
employed by the BCOF as labour. 16 This number alone, while small in comparison to a 
population of an entire harbour side city, was 28% the number of BCOF personnel in Japan at 
the time which was 25,000.17 Tamura discusses that the BCOF were dependent on the Japanese 
to help organise facilities for their troops. She states that by October of 1946 “the number of 
Japanese workers in Kure increased further and reached over 20,000.” 18  The groups of 
Japanese women in the Hiroshima area that had instigated relationships with American GIs 
before the BCOF’s arrival was noted by Allan Clifton. Clifton spoke about how American 
“recreation hall(s) thundered to the revelling and dancing of GIs and their Japanese 
girlfriends”19 and when the Australians and BCOF arrived “hundreds of these girls clung to the 
Americans in emotional farewells on the railway station.”20 While the Hiroshima prefecture 
was more rural and less densely populated than that of Tokyo, it is hard to believe that a smaller 
population of civilians would negate the possibility of fraternisation.  
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In newspaper articles addressing the issue of fraternisation to the Australian public, 
Northcott aimed to reassure that everything was under control. This was especially important 
due to the fact fraternisation between  and American GIs was common knowledge in the public 
sphere. In “Japan Troops Not Likely to Fraternise” Northcott was reported saying that “he 
anticipated less fraternisation.”21 His reasoning for this was that “the amount of entertainment 
to be provided for Australian troops would keep them too occupied to seek the company of 
Japanese.”22 The amenities for BCOF troops, aimed to compensate for non-fraternisation rules, 
was also covered in newspapers to settle a restless anti-Japanese nation. The BCOF were to 
have “their own newspaper, radio, films, clubs, and libraries,” as well as “specially conducted 
tours of scenic and historic places of interest.”23 However, reports from Northcott and lower 
officials to the Australian government state otherwise regarding these special amenities and 
entertainment for troops.  
In Northcott’s first reports back to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Australia, he discussed 
amenities and the lack there-of. Films, specifically, are emphasised in Northcott’s initial reports 
as being important.  Northcott nonetheless described the supply of films as unsatisfactory. In 
May 1946, soon after his arrival in Japan, Northcott stated that this lack of film supply was 
well known to the Australian Army Director of Amenities, and the Prime Minister himself was 
made aware during his visit to Japan between April and May of 1946.24 This importance of 
films was explained by Northcott as such: “The cinema is the mainstay of evening 
entertainment.” 25 This statement alone explains that Northcott sees the use of film as an 
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important distraction from other ‘evening entertainment’ must necessarily have included 
fraternisation with . Therefore, a lack of films caused great concern for what BCOF troops were 
doing instead. Issues with amenities were reported back to the Australian government as late 
as September 1946. The Minister for the Army, F.M Forde, wrote to Chifley about complaints 
by members of the Australian component of the BCOF. The amenities listed in the letter 
included films and playing equipment. Films for the BCOF were still limited as “American 
films [were] distributed through certain associations which are limited to defined geographical 
boundaries so that the association supplying films in Australia was not empowered to distribute 
them in Japan.”26 The cinema as a mainstay of evening entertainment, and a distraction from 
fraternisation, was still struggling to develop four months into the occupation, therefore the 
cinema was an ineffective anti-fraternisation technique. 
The idea of supplying playing fields and sports equipment to BCOF troops was also still 
an issue. While Northcott reported that sport fields were in use and clubs were being developed 
in late May27, the letter by Forde stated “the question of providing funds for the establishment 
of playing fields is still under consideration … the establishment of improvised playing fields 
is a matter which can only be undertaken locally.”28 There are a majority of photos from the 
occupation that have been archived in the Australian War Memorial showing Australian troops 
engaging with one another in sports along Kure’s beaches. It can be argued that these sports 
clubs that were developed were perhaps successful in some way in keeping troops occupied, 
even if it cannot be said how well it was able to do this. However, there was a long period of 
time between receiving the funds to obtain what was needed to develop this amenity. This then 
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opened more free time for Australian occupation troops to fraternise with the Japanese. Also 
mentioned in the letter was that there were issues with food rations, specifically a “shortage 
and absence of fresh fruit”29 as well as limited canteen supplies with soap and cigarette papers, 
and the issue of limited leave for Australian occupation troops.30  The fact that this letter was 
drafted in September 1946 demonstrates that the amenities promised to the BCOF were of 
limited capacity or still not supplied as of five months into the occupation.  
 
Figure 1: A group portrait of the Provost combined team from the BCOF rugby league premiers in 1950. Images like this 
from the Australian War Memorial display that eventually with the right equipment that sport proved to be an important off 
duty even for many BCOF troops.31 
 
In addition to the lack of amenities, during the first year of the occupation the BCOF 
lacked an acceptable standard of comfort in everyday life. Ian Nish, an officer in the British 
component of the BCOF described life in the BCOF zone was “difficult and … rigorous. 
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Conditions were Spartan and basic.” 32 Australian education officer, Arthur W. John, also 
commented on the facilities for the BCOF. As the BCOF were working in and around the 
Hiroshima area, much of the area had been subjected to air raids throughout World War II, not 
to mention one of the two atomic bombs. John described the facilities as far from satisfactory, 
“the BCOF area was not only provincial and comfortless, but most barracks were entirely 
lacking in heating arrangements when troops from tropical areas arrived at the end of the 
Japanese winters.”33 This transition from tropical areas to winter conditions took its toll on 
Australian troops. The issue of cold weather was one of the reasons that the BCOF accepted 
the Hiroshima area as the north island of Hokkaido would be too harsh for Australian and 
Indian components of the BCOF.34 It was reported by Massey Stanley in another news article 
that billets were without hot water and a shortage of blankets.35 In one report, Stanley states 
that “blanket supplies, which have been short throughout the occupation, are still not arriving 
as fast as troops.”36 This lack of necessities in the beginning of the occupation was simply 
another driving force of fraternisation. In discussion with an Australian BCOF troop with 
Stanley about the lack of facilities, he believed that “hell, the only way we can keep warm is 
to shack up with a Jap sheila.”37 
To make up for the lack of amenities during the early part of the occupation, and to avoid 
venereal disease, Japanese taxi-girls (or professional dancing partners) were hired in BCOF 
dance halls. 38 While Northcott did not approve of fraternisation with Japanese outside of 
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working hours, the lack of amenities earlier on in the occupation seemed to leave Northcott no 
choice and instead offered controlled interactions. A newspaper article discussing Japanese 
taxi-girls and their interaction with Australian troops went into the streets of Melbourne and 
asked the Australian public their opinions. From the six Australians interviewed the majority 
showed their dislike for fraternisation, only two of the six believed it was acceptable for troops 
to dance with these Japanese taxi-girls. J. Alexander, a salesman, said that “it seems harmless 
enough for the boys to go dancing,”39 reflecting Northcott’s ideas. However, the other four 
Australian’s saw an issue with this. The men who were interviewed saw the occupation as a 
job, Mr. Gray said that they were there to “teach the Japs a lesson”40 and that fraternising with 
Japanese women was “cheapening and bad for morale.”41 The Australian public remained 
harsh in their opinions of the Japanese compared to those in the BCOF who sustained contact 
with Japan. The women who were interviewed argued that the troops should be thinking about 
the families and relationships that were waiting for them in Australia. Miss Butler explained 
that “it is hard on wives and mothers in Australia to know that their boys are fraternising with 
the Japanese women.”42 This concern from the women of Australia influenced another attempt 
to limit fraternisation.  
The next attempt made by the government in limiting fraternisation of BCOF troops was 
to bring the families of Australian occupation troops to Japan. This aimed to lift the morale of 
the married component of the troops and refrain them from any interaction with . Much like 
the booklet, Know Japan, the families of the troops also received a booklet to inform them 
about Japan that was called BCOF Bound. In the booklet forwarded by Commander in Chief 
Robertson, the role of BCOF family members is described as “bringing once more to members 
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of the force the ties of home and family on which our Western civilisation has been built.”43 
The families would be “introducing into the force that which everyone has missed above all – 
home life and the companionship of one’s family.”44 This ‘companionship’ with wives and 
children of Australian troops was meant to out-weigh the companionship that had started to 
appear with the Japanese through fraternisation. They were asked to follow the same 
fraternisation laws as the BCOF and Northcott’s personal instructions as added as Appendix D 
to the booklet. Described in the booklet itself was “when you have dealings with the Japanese, 
including your servants, keep them at a distance and be formal about things … remember that 
the Japanese will be evaluating the democratic way of living by the way in which they see you 
act and conduct yourselves.”45 Much like how the BCOF troops were expected to demonstrate 
the goal of democratisation in Japan, the families of troops were expected to do the same in 
their dealings. By being given the same fraternisation laws as BCOF troops, it can be speculated 
that the wives and children of the BCOF were expected to have the same strictness placed upon 
them. While the families of Australian troops were brought to Japan as an attempt to discourage 
fraternisation, one would argue that it seemed to cause fraternisation to flourish in different 
ways.  
Journalist Massey Stanley argued that due to lack of proper amenities there was nothing 
else for Australian troops to do but fraternise with the Japanese. In the same stream of thought 
as Stanley’s article was a letter sent to the government by a BCOF officer by the name of ‘Bill’. 
While there is no further evidence to explain who this man was, his letter to the Australian 
government has its own folder in the collection of venereal disease reports for the BCOF in 
Canberra’s Australian War Memorial. The letter discusses Bill’s views of the situation of the 
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BCOF, dated late 1946. He observed that the demographic of BCOF soldiers was young and 
“had little or no experience of army life … particularly evidence in the Australian contingent 
where the venereal rate is, in proportion, far and away ahead of that for the remainder of the 
force.”46 As seen in the last chapter, the young demographic of the Australian troops caused 
there to be an impact in fraternisation as ideals and ways of approaching the occupation would 
be different to what was expected of older soldiers. Bill believed that the BCOF anti-
fraternisation policy was stupid, and that the BCOF “simply eggs a man on to the doors of the 
VD hospital.”47 Again, there is this idea that while the BCOF had amenities to discourage 
fraternisation, their poor organisation influenced fraternisation. “Bill” also made note of the 
BCOF’s poor living conditions. While American troops received “beautiful meat, chicken, 
pork and so forth” the BCOF had “vitamin tablets to make up for deficiencies … [and] tropical 
spread which looks (and tastes) like inferior Vaseline.”48 What can be understood from Bill’s 
letter regarding both fraternisation with prostitutes and the issue of amenities is that much like 
how the BCOF was organised prior to being in Japan, there was still a lot of unorganised 
complications which affected their troops. 
3.3 THE  AND SEXUAL FRATERNISATION 
As stated in the personal instruction, the BCOF placed emphasis on the restriction of out 
of bound areas. These out-of-bounds areas included brothels that were known as Recreation 
Amusement Centres (RAA). For the American component of the occupation, fraternisation 
policies were put in place in response to the use of brothels and sex workers. By the time that 
the BCOF came to Japan in March 1946, the issue of fraternisation with sex workers had been 
established as a consistent problem for United States occupying forces. Due to the 
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fraternisation issues experienced by the Americans, BCOF policy focused on attempting to 
enforce new restrictions on out-of- bounds areas, mainly the brothels. The RAA brothels, 
specifically, became the central point of sexual relationships in the occupation. These brothels, 
and the women and men in their walls, were a major part fraternisation across the entire 
occupation.  
The employment of sex workers to cater for the occupation troops began within the first 
month of the occupation and continued in an escalated manner until BCOF’s introduction to 
Japan. When news came of the early occupation by America and their allies, the Japanese 
government feared what would happen to the purity of their nation, especially the purity of 
their women. When the occupation was announced to the Japanese, the recruitment of women 
began across Japan. Advertisements for special female workers was placed in mainstream 
media while police were ordered to recruit as many licensed and unlicensed sex workers in 
order to develop comfort stations for occupation troops.49 Comfort stations have been used 
throughout Japanese military history.50 This idea of comfort stations was quickly implemented 
into the occupation as a way, as Hicks describes it to prevent “rape and disorder among their 
own population.”51 The Japanese government called these comfort stations the Recreation 
Amusement Centres.  
In the first six months of the Allied Occupation, the RAA system was the central base of 
sexual fraternisation. In an official statement, the RAA operators said that the aims of the RAA 
were to “promote mutual understanding between the allied occupation forces and our people 
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… to contribute to the smooth development of people’s diplomacy and abet the constitution of 
a peaceful world.”52 However, the statement did not explain that the Japanese were using the 
centres, and subsequently the women working there, to defend the nation’s racial purity.53 
Women who were recruited into the RAA were between the ages of eighteen and twenty five, 
and their economic position was usually poor after the devastation of the war. For many 
Japanese after the war, homelessness and starvation was an everyday reality, and the RAA 
offered women in this desperate position a place to stay, clothing and food. By one estimate, 
in Tokyo alone there were an estimated 10,000 comfort women working within the RAA and 
in total 84,000 across all the territories in Japan.54 The most well-known of the RAA facilities 
was the International Palace in Tokyo that was described by one soldier as “probably the largest 
brothel in the world.”55 While the Japanese government handed out over a million condoms at 
the beginning of the occupation, venereal disease (VD) was impossible to prevent. By early 
1946, there were 233 cases of venereal disease for every 1,000 American troops.56 This high 
number told MacArthur that action had to be taken against fraternisation to lower the cases of 
venereal disease.  
This epidemic of VD in American occupation troops caused the RAA brothels to be 
placed off bounds for the BCOF, as to not repeat America’s VD outbreak, with many closing. 
After eight months of American use of these government run brothels, the RAA was declared 
off limits in March 194657, the month that BCOF troops officially started their duty in Japan. 
Women that worked in these brothels were removed from their lodgings, which forced them to 
continue their work on unsafe streets while being marginalised by other Japanese with the term 
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.58 However, the Public Health and Welfare institute emphasised a ban on prostitution by 
ordering the Japanese government to abolish and ban licensed prostitution. Not only was it 
against “the ideals of democracy”59 which went against the goals of the occupation, but it was 
also the breeding ground of fraternisation. As Mark McLelland states, “the closing of the RAA 
marked the beginning of greater clampdowns on fraternisation” and is the beginning of 
fraternisation laws for America and also served as the foundations of the fraternisation policies 
placed upon the BCOF. 60  
While the closing of the RAA did indeed mark clampdowns on fraternisation, it was not 
uncommon for the BCOF troops to fraternise with  during the occupation. While the BCOF 
had come to Japan under a strict anti-fraternisation rules, troops (especially Australian troops) 
ignored the personal instruction given to them. Clifton described the beginning of Australia’s 
time in Japan as an introduction back into “feminine society.”61 Because of this, Australian 
troops “made no secret of what they wanted, or of their readiness, willingness and ability to 
recover lost ground.”62 Another name given to , and women in general, by Australian troops 
was ‘moose’, derived from the first part of the Japanese word musume, which translates into 
English as girl, or daughter.63 From Allan Clifton’s time in Japan he saw the word moose as 
girls “in a great game hunt” where “the term was singularly apt.”64  
Clifton, who could speak Japanese, found himself early in the occupation acting as a 
translator for troops who wished to have sexual relations with Japanese women. The 
perceptions of the Japanese did not ignore opinions on the ‘physical allure’ of Japanese women. 
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Robin Gerster says the attractiveness of the Japanese was “a staple of male occupation 
discourse.”65 Half of the BCOF admired the Japanese women, especially geishas, with Alan 
Queale describing them as “very feminine, exotic creatures.”66 The other half of the troops, 
such as G.E Morrison, perceived the Japanese was as “misshaped, cackling little dot[s] with 
black teeth.”67 Despite this, as Gerster states, it “did not stop them [Australians] from having 
sex.”68 Sexual fraternisation and venereal disease became so engrained to the BCOF that it 
developed its own landmark. The hospital in Kure, specifically made for treating venereal 
disease was known as ‘the house that Jack built,’ Jack being a colloquial term for venereal 
disease.69  
The media coverage of fraternisation in Australia gave an insight into how fraternisation 
was perceived by a wider audience and not just the government officials. This media coverage 
had an influence on how the BCOF conducted their anti-fraternisation policy to ensure that the 
Australian public remained content with the occupation of Japan. However, media coverage of 
fraternisation was at times sporadic, especially at the start of the occupation. At times it was 
reported that Australian troops and the BCOF were not ones to fraternise and that American 
troops were the main offenders. In a newspaper article, Massey Stanley wrote about American 
troops walking arm-in-arm with Japanese women; Australian troops were described as “not 
only fraternising less than the Americans, but they have never been street cuddlers.” 70 
However, in early March 1946, Stanley also published an article in the Daily Telegraph that 
stated, “Our Men in Japan Can’t help Fraternising.” It is in this article that he speaks about 
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disclosing “the discomfort, difficulties, and special temptations.” 71  This contradiction of 
concepts about Australian troops showed that from an early point in the occupation, 
fraternisation was at a high enough rate to be unable to avoid media coverage in Australia.  
Clifton, while first acting as an interpreter for Australian troops who wished to spend 
time with Japanese women, also saw a darkness in the way that Australian troops fraternised 
with Japanese women. In a later chapter of his memoir, entitled Yabanjin (Barbarian), he talks 
about his experiences of dealing with rape victims. He remembered when Japanese authorities 
contacted him about the rape and assault of a young married woman by two soldiers. She had 
been enjoying her honeymoon in an inn when the assault occurred. Clifton was “amazed and 
shocked to see a tall, handsome lad of twenty-one or two years of age, with a mild look on his 
fresh face.”72 After being interrogated and probed, the victim turned to Clifton and said that 
“nothing but bitterness and humiliation”73 awaited her. Clifton dealt with numerous crimes 
against the civil population, to the point where he felt ashamed of his affiliation with 
Australians which caused him to “discard the slouch hat and wear instead the officer type 
peaked hat.”74 Clifton believed that because “women offered themselves at street corners or 
railway stations in exchange for almost anything that was edible … any condition for criminal 
assault was impossible.”75 From what treatment was given to the , it can be argued, as Gerster 
explains, that BCOF troops “remained largely indifferent to the physical and social 
consequences of their promiscuity.”76 
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3.4 THE ISSUE OF VENEREAL DISEASE IN THE BCOF 
In Northcott’s first report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Australia, prior to April 12, 1946 
the issue of venereal disease was already a topic of concern. In section 16 Northcott wrote that 
“(T)he incidence of Venereal Disease is very high and will continue to be so. Two hundred and 
eighty-six cases were diagnosed in March, when only a portion of the Force had arrived. Every 
effort is being made by all concerned to combat this menace.”77 While this number was not 
separated into the different components of the BCOF, later reports started to do this, and 
showing that most of cases were Australian. These reports then escalated at the end of 1946 to 
weekly reports of venereal disease infections. Illnesses such as cholera, typhoid fever and 
malaria were also found among BCOF troops, however, venereal disease was still the highest 
number of cases throughout the occupation. From 1946 to 49, the more vital years of BCOF’s 
role in the occupation, there was a constant stream of government documentation that discussed 
the ongoing issue of venereal disease, especially within the Australian component of the BCOF.  
The numbers of cases recorded by the BCOF show that sexual fraternisation was consistent 
throughout the occupation and that Northcott’s personal instruction was constantly neglected.  
The incidences of venereal disease were considered significant enough to have weekly 
reports and commentary issued by the Joint Chiefs-of-Staff (JCOSA) in Australia for the 
Australian government. One report from late 1948 noted that there were “approximately 250 
infections per 1,000 men per annum.”78 It also noticed a pattern in recurring cases, stating that 
“a limited section is responsible for a considerable percentage of the V.D. now occurring.” It 
cited two thirds of troops coming to hospital with venereal disease had suffered a venereal 
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disease previously during the occupation.79 This example shows that while there were fewer 
cases of venereal disease in newer troops, those who had been fraternising and as a result being 
infected were continuing to fraternise and displaying the lack of control in anti-fraternisation. 
Along with weekly commentary was the reported numbers of venereal disease. These 
numbers emphasised that while venereal disease was noticeable across the entire BCOF force, 
it was the Australian troops that contracted the most venereal diseases. A major part of this was 
due to the number of Australian’s in the occupation compared to the British, Indians and New 
Zealanders. At the beginning of the Occupation there were 11,500 Australian troops in 
comparison to 10,000 British, 9,500 Indians and 4,500 New Zealanders. 80  This number 
continued to grow, especially as the other contingents of the BCOF began to pull out in the 
later years of the occupation. However, this drastic difference of numbers statistically showed 
that Australian troops were sexually fraternising more than the rest of the BCOF and 
contracting venereal disease because of this.  
The following charts have been created from collating information from a set of 
documents from September 1946 to December 1947. These charts represent venereal disease 
rates in the four main divisions of the BCOF: Britain, Australia, India and New Zealand.81 To 
observe venereal disease rates within the BCOF, the JCOSA developed weekly reports. These 
reports collected the weekly venereal disease infection rate for each division, as well as the 
number of troops per thousand. The reports were also accompanied with details on what was 
being done to prevent venereal disease and fraternisation.82 
                                                     
79 JCOSA. “Weekly V.D Commentary for Week Ending 5 November” 12 November, 1948, Policy Control of 
Venereal Disease, British Commonwealth Occupation Force found in Australian War Memorial, Canberra 
AWM 114, 267/6/17 Part 3 
80 Nish. “The Occupation of Japan,” 59. 
81 These charts do not include the Air Force and Navy divisions of each country as the number of infections 
from these areas were either nil in the majority of reports or were of an insufficient number. 
82 Incidence of VD [Venereal Disease] in BCOF, National Archives of Australia, Canberra, A816 - 29/301/562. 
56 
 
  
Figure 2: Weekly Rate of Venereal Disease Infections in the BCOF (September 1946 – December 1947) 
 
 
Figure 3: Weekly Rate of Venereal Disease Infections in the BCOF per Thousand (September 1946 – December 1947) 
 
There are a number of observations that can be taken from these charts. The first is that 
in total the Australian division had the highest rate of venereal disease per week. The Indian 
division followed Australia, however, their involvement in the BCOF stopped at the later part 
of 1947. The British component of the BCOF remained at a steady rate throughout their time 
during the occupation, but in the same way as the Indian division, their numbers began to 
withdraw from Japan around the same time. As seen at the end of 1947, the New Zealand 
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division became more active in ratio of one troop per thousand. However, this was only in 
comparison to the size of their division, which was the smallest population group (estimated at 
4,500 at the beginning of the occupation, compared to 11,500 Australians).83 While rising in 
number of infections per thousand troops, their weekly numbers still did not compare to that 
of the Australian portion of the BCOF who, over the sixteen months of reports, averaged to 
sixty-one infections reported weekly. While this could be attributed to the fact that the 
Australians took up most of the BCOF’s force population, with their number peaking in 
February 1947 at 12,000 troops, it still does not deny that fraternisation in relation to venereal 
disease was occurring in high numbers for the Australian portion of the BCOF.84 
With the alarming rate of venereal disease visible within the BCOF, specifically in 
Australian troops, there was a lot of discussion throughout the occupation to try and contain 
and control the issue of venereal disease. In February of 1948, documentation was made 
regarding the concerns and suggested preventions of venereal disease. The techniques put in 
place, such as films being evening entertainment, were not stopping the rate of venereal disease 
infection. The BCOF administration did acknowledge this and continued to try and find new 
techniques to negate fraternisation. This emphasised that fraternisation was still happening at 
a steady rate and that the BCOF was struggling to regulate their policy. Commander in Chief, 
Robertson, directed in this document that “all other problems … at the present time fade into 
insignificance compared with the problem of VD.” 85  The document goes into detail about the 
measures that are to be taken to limit the number of venereal disease. These control measures 
fell into six main categories: indoctrination, personal prophylactic measures, discipline, 
provost action, amenities and documentation of sources.   
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Indoctrination focused on the moral and spiritual aspects of the BCOF troops lives. This 
strategy was run by chaplains who were brought to Japan to raise the morale of occupation 
troops. A similar situation occurred in the American component. The United States put into 
place workshops that focused on character-building education, such as guidance, provision of 
religious education and physical education in hopes of turning troops away from sexual 
fraternisation.86 The BCOF made special lectures from chaplain’s compulsory and each unit 
was visited and personally addressed in their denominational groups. As described in the 
document “these lectures will be on the moral, spiritual and social aspects of sexual promiscuity 
and are able to be entirely independent of Medical Officers’ lectures.” 87  This moral and 
spiritual measure therefore lined up with the medical aspect. 
The medical component of anti-venereal disease measures was obviously important as 
they were the ones who treated the disease. In a report titled Health in BCOF from April 1948, 
it was prefaced that “apart from VD casualties, the general health of BCOF has been 
surprisingly grand.”88 Therefore, most medical officers were dealing with venereal disease 
compared to anything else. The document outlines the role of medical officers in anti-venereal 
disease techniques. It included lectures on venereal disease with “methods of infection, its 
effects on the body and mind, its effects on women and children and the high incidence of 
venereal disease among the Japanese.” 89  Medical officers used films, posters, booklets, 
pamphlets, waxwork models and preserved or live venereal disease exhibits for instruction. 
During Northcott’s time as Commander in Chief, he reported that in the first few months of the 
occupation over seven thousand troops had seen an informative film on venereal disease, 
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meaning that they had been trying to educate the troops since the very beginning.90 The medical 
aspect of the prevention document aligned with personal prophylaxis, which stated that medical 
officers would have a supply of condoms always readily available. While having condoms 
allowed for there to be less cases of venereal disease, it only emphasised the ability to fraternise 
with prostitutes as there was less chance of developing a venereal disease and therefore less 
chance to be discovered by superior officers. Condoms were also an unspoken recognition that 
troops would indeed continue to fraternise sexually. This is clear from the use of condoms from 
American GI’s at the Imperial Palace brothel in Tokyo in a quote from Robert Whiting on the 
Palace: “[t]he moat around the Imperial Palace was so clogged with used condoms it had to be 
cleaned out once a week with a big wire scoop.”91 Condoms seemed to promote fraternisation 
in the American area of the occupation, and did the same to the BCOF.  
Despite this, discipline was an important measure to prevent venereal disease. The most 
important aspect of the discipline was the development of Vice Squads. The duty of these 
squads was to “remove prostitutes and other undesirable persons from the neighbourhood or 
barracks[,] to see that troops under influence of alcohol are returned to their billets … [and] to 
generally prevent members of their units from  becoming venereal disease casualties.”92 A 
technique for both America and the BCOF during the occupation to try and control venereal 
disease was to round up Japanese women for medical check-ups, which began with collecting 
the  but quickly escalated to the indiscriminate round up of Japanese women. These medical 
examinations were normally intrusive and greatly upset, embarrassed and damaged the pride 
of Japanese women.93 Discipline also focused on Northcott’s personal instructions to troops 
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about remaining formal and emphasised the importance of “lights out” and ensuring that the 
consumption of alcohol by troops was observed “in order to prevent individuals from 
consuming excessive quantities,” 94  which would influence sexual fraternisation. Provost 
Actions, in addition, asked for the BCOF and the Vice teams of the BCOF to work in unity 
with the civil police to ensure that the Japanese citizens were controlled, aligning with the 
control of brothel locations and the medical round ups of Japanese women.  
Amenities were emphasised as a measure to prevent venereal disease also. The 
importance of amenities was to stop troops from becoming bored as “when interest is lost men 
become bored and often seek relief from their boredom by diversions in questionable haunts.”95 
However, the issue of amenities was grand in itself and while by 1948 there was a number of 
active clubs and ways to ‘distract’ troops, the lack of amenities at the beginning of the 
Occupation shows this was not always the case.  
Marshal Henderson suggested a way of regulating venereal disease that would possibly 
have been more humane. Instead of restricting brothels, Henderson proposed developing a 
‘semi-official’ red light district that would receive regular medical check-ups. This would not 
only have caused sexual fraternisation to become managed but would also avoid the intrusive 
medical roundups of women suspected of having venereal disease. However, Henderson’s 
ideas were rejected at the last moment by BCOF staff. This was perhaps due to public opinion 
in Australia, which showed that Australians were unimpressed with the idea of Australian 
troops with Japanese women and what Arthur W. John describes as an opinion “compounded 
of unrealism and wartime hatreds.”96 John recounted that Henderson was furious about this 
decision and said that when he had spoken to Henderson after the decision that “his remarks 
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would not bear repeating.”97 This perhaps could have been the best possible way to control 
sexual fraternisation and venereal disease. However, this was sadly not the case and venereal 
disease continued at a steady.98 
It was suggested in 1948 that Australian troops who contracted a venereal disease be 
returned to Australia as punishment. However, this idea of returning troops to Australia was 
not supported by the Ministers for Navy and Air. The Minster for Navy believed that “past 
experience has shown that the infliction of penalties leads to concealment of the disease with 
its resultant ill health and spread of disease.”99 The Minister for Air also expressed similar 
opinions. While the goal was to seek a new form of punishment on those who contract venereal 
diseases, advice from the Services Medial Directors Sub-Committee suggested that instead 
there should be no penalties on service personnel who contracted venereal disease. Reasons 
given were that financial penalties only encouraged members to obtain illicit treatment, which 
caused an inflated percentage of cases of urethritis. It was also stated that in some cases of 
venereal disease that “no code, whether military or moral, had been violated by the members 
in contracting infection”100 and would therefore be unfair to punish them so strictly. This 
echoes the concept that Northcott’s personal instruction was not, per say, a code. In the 
document reported above discussing anti-venereal disease methods, developed around the 
same time, that troops were to be told that “except for statutory deductions from pay, no 
penalties will be incurred for contracting venereal disease and that the diagnosis will be treated 
as confidential.”101 This showed that while venereal disease was a top priority issue for the 
                                                     
97 John, Uneasy Lies the Head that Wears the Crown, 26. 
98 John remarked that Henderson returned to civil occupation in New South Wales after this incident.  
99 “Policy Regarding Return of Members of BCOF Who Contract VD” 1 September 1948, National Archives of 
Australia, Canberra, A816, 29/301/559. 
100 Ibid., 2. 
101 BCOF Administrative Instructions AG 108 “Prevention of Venereal Disease, BCOF.” 24 February 1948, 
Victorian Archives, Melbourne. MP313/5. 2. 
62 
 
BCOF staff, fraternisation that revolved around venereal disease was difficult to deal with due 
to the number of different factors influencing it.  
The conclusion of the 1948 prevention of venereal disease document stated that “the VD 
rate in BCOF now materially exceeds the present rate in Germany and is the highest rate 
anywhere in the world where BCF [British Commonwealth Forces] are serving. That is a 
staggering and disastrous fact and is to be remedied at once.”102 The rate of venereal disease 
shown can only set the argument that fraternisation, especially on a sexual level, happened 
through the occupation at a consistent rate despite measures the BCOF attempted to put into 
place through the occupation.  
In a cabinet agendum that took place, asking “to consider whether there should be any 
change in the existing policy regarding fraternisation”103 in 1949, the personal instruction was 
described as the present policy on fraternisation and “no further instructions in the matter [had] 
been issued by head-quarters, BCOF.”104 
3.5 CONCLUSION 
The personal instruction of John Northcott, acting as the BCOF’s anti-fraternisation 
policy, focuses primarily on the idea of out-of-bound areas and the fraternisation that 
commenced within them. Prostitution and sexual fraternisation, especially if there was the 
possibility that it would lead to venereal disease, was the form of fraternisation of greatest 
concern. This form of fraternisation occurred at a consistent rate throughout the BCOF’s 
participation in the occupation, as can be seen in the number of government reports and 
documents that voiced concern, especially for the Australian component of the BCOF.  
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While this type of fraternisation posed the threat of health issues within the occupation 
forces, other types of fraternisation continued to thrive. This caused the anti-fraternisation 
policy of the BCOF, which aimed to be the strictest anti-fraternisation policy of the occupation, 
to be continuously undermined.  
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4 BLACK MARKETS, MARRIAGES AND BEYOND 
Fraternisation with sex workers was the most discussed and debated aspect of the 
fraternisation for the BCOF. However, this was not the only form of fraternisation. There were 
numerous ways in which Australians connected and interacted with the Japanese that was not 
explicitly sexual in nature.  This chapter focuses on these forms of fraternisation. It will begin 
by looking at the two other main areas of fraternisation: troops’ relationships with those 
Japanese operating on the black market and with Japanese women which led to marriage.  
This chapter will also discuss methods of fraternisation that were of lesser concern to 
BCOF administration. These forms of fraternisation varied from passive to hostile in nature, 
from gift giving and friendship to theft and physical abuse. The chapter will then conclude with 
the debates concerning possible changes to BCOF policy on fraternisation. The nature of the 
occupation was changing with the threat of communism and the escalation of the Cold War, 
therefore the behaviour of troops towards the Japanese was put under analysis to whether if it 
should become more lenient or not. 
4.1 BLACK MARKETS AND FRATERNISATION 
The black market was crucial to the Japanese economy and the Japanese people post 
World War II. However, it was an illegal string of businesses and often resulted in acts of theft 
against the occupation forces. It was part of BCOF operations to make sure the black-market 
system in the Hiroshima area was controlled and thieves were caught and prosecuted. Despite 
this, the black market and BCOF troops had a mutual relationship of selling and trading goods 
throughout the occupation.  
At the end of World War II, the black market in Japan was a piece of the economy that 
supported those in dire situations. Not only did the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki 
cause death and mass homelessness, but Japanese citizens had been suffering for an extended 
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period due to the war. Japan had been in a state of war since 1931, starting with the conquest 
of Manchuria which quickly expanded into a second Sino-Japanese War with China in 1937. 
Over time, food shortages started to plague Japan and escalated with the defeat in World War 
II. Dower explains that the defeat of Japan severed their food supplies throughout Asia and the 
timing of the surrender in midsummer meant that rice harvests were running out.1 As a result 
of typhoons and extensive flooding, the 1945 rice harvest had also been recorded as being the 
worst since 1910 which produced only two thirds the normal rice stock.2 The occupation 
seemed to make the situation worse.  
After surrender, the Japanese continued to suffer from starvation and lack of proper 
amenities which left many homeless. BCOF officer, Stuart Inder, described in a letter to his 
mother the condition of the Japanese people in mid-1946. He said that “the Yanks have all the 
food in the world at Osaka, yet the Japs are dying from starvation at the rate of five a day.”3 
The same letter also explained that within the Osaka subways the month before that “1000 dead 
waifs”4 were cleared. The Japanese were living a harsh reality post-war, a citizens group called 
“The Peoples Association for a Policy Against Starvation” reported that by mid-November that 
733 Japanese had died of starvation in locations around Kobe, Kyoto, Osaka, Nagoya and 
Yokohama.5 As Clifton mentions in his memoir: “the black market, or yamiichi, was not just 
an abstraction in Japan, it was a very substantial reality.”6 The black market became a reality 
when goods supplied by the government were set at specific prices, and some were too 
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expensive for citizens to be able to purchase. However, there was no control over the selling 
of second-hand goods.7  
The black market in Japan after World War II did not revolve around exotic, rare or 
illegal items. For many Japanese, this was the only type of market that ensured survival. John 
Dower discusses the saying onna wa , otoko wa katsugiya – translating to ‘women become , 
men become carriers for the black market’ and saw that while the  lived in a world that slowly 
became westernised over the occupation, the Japanese black market remained “first and last 
for the Japanese.”8 A role of the BCOF, among demilitarisation and democratisation, was to 
ensure that the black market was kept under control while the United States and the Japanese 
government strengthened and developed a new economy. In an order from September 19, 1947 
BCOF troops were prohibited from giving in any way, shape or form items to the Japanese that 
was from any kind or service or association organised by the BCOF that could in some way 
influence black market trading.9 Despite this, the faces of occupation troops could still be found 
among the markets, fraternising both as buyers and contributors to the economy. 
The use of the black market, while being a valuable economic tool for those Japanese 
citizens who were suffering from starvation, also affected the occupation troops. The issue of 
BCOF stock being stolen while in transit and sold on the black market escalated to the point 
where it was then deemed necessary for armed guards to escort supplies. 10  Alongside 
demilitarisation and democratisation, the BCOF developed a Special Investigation Branch 
(SIB) dedicated to raids on potential black-market operations. It was estimated that in one 
month alone the group had managed to recover goods from the black market to an estimated 
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value of 47,000 yen.11 Ian Nish pointed out in his time in Japan that as demilitarisation became 
less of an issue the BCOF were then put in charge of operations regarding black market raids.12 
However, much like observations with the issue of venereal disease, the black market was hard 
to control and BCOF troops contributed to this lack of control.  
 
Figure 4: The SIB, collaborating with Japanese police, in the seizure of contraband drugs near Kure. This contraband was 
smuggled to Japan from China and Korea and consisted of millions of yens worth of antibiotics.13  
 
The black market opened a whole new avenue in which fraternisation could occur. The 
interaction of the BCOF with the black market was, for the most part, simple business 
transactions which benefited both sides. In many accounts, the fraternisation of troops with 
black market business was active from the very beginning of the BCOF’s time in Japan. Clifton 
describes this as ‘wogging’ and says that the BCOF would use the funds “chiefly to buy sake 
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and beer, and to pay for their erotic experiences, all very costly in more than one way.”14 The 
BCOF troops were trading everyday items that could not otherwise be obtained by Japanese 
citizens. These items were mainly from the troops own selection of canteen goods that 
generally included 100 cigarettes and four ounces of tobacco, seven bottle of beer, chocolate, 
biscuits, a cake of soap and a tin of salted peanuts.15 Inder, in another letter to his mother, 
observed that “the boys draw their weekly rations … this can be sold to any Nip you want to 
pick off the street at fixed black market prices … it is not long then before the boys begin to 
collect a ward of notes, some of them with two or three thousand [yen].”16 BCOF troops would 
justify their fraternisation with the black market by blaming their own lack of amenities. One 
group of BCOF troops who were interviewed on a freighter returning to Japan “that troops are 
not getting a fair deal from the canteens.”17 Not only was the black market itself a form of 
fraternisation, but the yen BCOF troops received allowed them to fraternise more freely with . 
Business transactions benefited citizens beyond what the Japanese government was offering 
them. A restaurant owner in Hiroshima spoke to Clifton on the issue and asked, “why must I 
pay, for instance, fifty yen for very inferior locally made biscuits, when I can buy from your 
soldiers infinitely better ones for forty-five yen?”18 Therefore, the fraternisation between the 
BCOF and the black-market workers was, in general, greatly beneficial to both sides.  
There were numerous different techniques in how the BCOF would operate within the 
black market, where some were more secretive than others. Clifton recalled how soldiers would 
alight the tram opposite to Hiroshima’s main station and would do their black-market dealings 
while being surrounded by Japanese citizens.19 Other dealings would happen just outside the 
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gates of BCOF camps; some black marketeers would wait outside for troops who were going 
on leave with their canteens. There would be a trade-off of goods and yen after the black-
market businessmen evaluated the canteen.20 Other black-market interactions were as simple 
as meeting Japanese residents while a troop was out patrolling and would barter cigarettes for 
yen.21 The variety of ways in which the BCOF fraternised with the black market shows that it 
was difficult to control and regulations around trading BCOF goods to the Japanese were 
disregarded. 
BCOF troops would not only sell their canteens to the Japanese but managed to use 
BCOF regulations to their advantage to profit more. A BCOF administrative instruction dated 
May 26, 1947 made clear: “Arrangements have been made whereby dependants of BCOF and 
non-service personnel and their dependents in Japan may, where suitable articles are not 
available from BCOF canteens, obtain such articles including clothing and textiles direct from 
traders in Australia.”22 This meant that items could be shipped from Australia to Japan without 
any suspicion of being sold on the black market. With this, BCOF troops would ask their family 
to send items to Japan to sell them.23 Inder frequently used this loop hole, as is evident in letters 
to his mother. He asked his mother to send saccharin as “it will be a great help up here … its 
really worth cash.”24 In later letters, it is clear that his mother complied with such requests. At 
the start of 1947 Inder wrote a letter back to his mother with the response that “within five 
minutes of being opened [the saccharin] had been transformed into 2000 yen, you will get it 
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back in the form of a dinner set shortly.”25 As suggested in this letter, the money that was 
gained from the black market also went to items of leisure that were not readily available to 
the BCOF troops.  
Inder wrote in letters to his mother that he purchased kimonos, silks, gramophones, 
camera parts, type writers and more from Japan and shipped them home to family members as 
gifts. Another BCOF member, Clifton Pugh, said he had purchased a movie camera off the 
black market and had something of a treasury. “I bought a lot of things actually.” He said. “I 
had rolls of beautiful pure silks, a pile of pearls, I actually did collect quite a few things – 
including quite a few paintings.”26 Because of the BCOF administration’s choice to allow 
troops to request items from Australia, they gave BCOF troops better items to sell on the black 
market, enabling more fraternisation.  
As was the case with most criticisms towards the BCOF, black market fraternisation was 
reported on in Australian media. E.J Thwaites reported in one Australian newspaper that “black 
marketing is so general that it is impossible to control … I should say that all ranks indulge 
freely on the black market.”27 This article was published in 1948, which demonstrates that the 
issue of the black market, and the fraternisation that happened in this area was difficult to 
control. However, like venereal disease, the black-market dealings received their own media 
attention. On January 1, 1948, The Herald described the BCOF as being in a ‘racket’ due to 
the amassed sums of Japanese yen that were due to widespread back-marketeering.28 At one 
point in 1948 it was reported by B.J. McDonald that the sum of 40 Million yen was being 
“irregularly introduced into the BCOF.”29 As with trying to limit other areas of fraternisation, 
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the BCOF had techniques to stop its troops from interacting with the black market as 
contributors and customers. This included a new form of military currency within the BCOF 
that would make the use of Japanese yen in any BCOF establishment redundant. These 
vouchers, as described by the Minister for the Army, Mr Chambers “would become legal tender 
only within the BCOF for the issue of pay and allowances.”30 There was also what Davies 
describes as a ‘gift train,’ which was used to sell souvenirs to units that were in scattered 
locations at reasonable prices as a way to stop the purchasing of fine items such as silk kimonos 
and dining sets through bartering on the black-market.31  
While many analyse the concept of fraternisation as being either romantic or friendly 
relationships with an enemy, the relationship of the troops with those in the black market was 
clearly based on economic foundations. The BCOF troops gave those Japanese living in 
poverty the supplies that they needed to survive and in return the Japanese gave the BCOF the 
yen needed to either expand their fraternisation to the  and beyond, or purchase items to send 
home as a slice of Japanese culture for family and friends. 
4.2 MARRIAGE BETWEEN BCOF AND THE JAPANESE 
It was against BCOF regulations to fraternise with the Japanese outside of business, let 
alone marry. By 1948, three years into the occupation of Japan, the lifestyle of the BCOF had 
changed dramatically and “romantic and sexual relations with the Japanese had developed and 
continued as a separate way of life.”32 While in no way approved by BCOF administration, 
marriage between BCOF troops and Japanese citizens was not an uncommon occurrence. 
Marriage ceremonies worked around BCOF regulations in secrecy, and while not seen as 
legally official in some cases still showed how fraternisation policies were being ignored for 
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love. When the news of marriage between BCOF troops and Japanese women reached 
Australia there was a public outcry. This escalated towards the end of the occupation, when 
troops wished to bring their war brides to Australia. It led to a debate in the Australian 
government on if these Japanese war brides should be allowed entrance into Australia. 
Marriage was therefore a form of fraternisation in the BCOF that aimed to surpass the 
occupation and become a lifelong commitment.  
Due to World War II and the atomic bomb, the number of Japanese men in the Hiroshima 
area was small. Tamura says that “consciously or unconsciously, many young Japanese women 
would have been aware that if they wanted to talk, dance, flirt, go on a date or have a sexual 
relationship with an uncommitted young man, then it would have to be with a solider from the 
occupying forces.”33 Much like how the young BCOF troops, young Japanese women were 
looking for companionship to try and restructure their world in a post-war society. Some BCOF 
troops thought of mixed marriage as a joke due to their negative perceptions of the Japanese. 
Inder spoke negatively about the situation of marriage, despite showing some admiration for 
the Japanese women in letters to his mother. Inder believed that “there is not a man in the 
BCOF who would officially marry a Nip … occasionally you might meet one that appeals to 
you but never the less they can hardly compare with an Australian girl … they are not in the 
same class and it is ridiculous to imagine marriage.”34 However, Arthur believes, much in the 
same stream of understanding as Tamura on young Japanese women, that “it was …. unrealistic 
to suppose that young servicemen in the prime of life could be … kept aloof from the young 
women of the country by means of routine orders.”35  
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The BCOF strongly discouraged marriage between troops and Japanese women. The 
Army Public Relations stated that “every obstacle is put in the way,”36 when trying to stop 
marriages from occurring. Marriage itself was not forbidden in the BCOF. If a member of the 
BCOF wished to get married, he or she would abided by the rules that were in place. These 
rules stated that no member of the BCOF could marry without the authority of the Commander 
in Chief or his own commander. A Chaplain would then proceed with the ceremony on this 
approval.37 However, these rules only applied to marriages within the BCOF itself, between 
those in the women’s services and the troops. Clement Govett was an example of this and met 
his wife at another branch of the BCOF during his time there.38 In routine BCOF orders issued 
by Commander in Chief Robertson, under ‘Marriage in Japan’ it was stated that “approval will 
not be given for a marriage between a member of the BCOF and a Japanese National.” The 
orders continued, stating that if unapproved marriages occurred under Japanese civil law then 
three things would occur. The first would be disciplinary action, the second being “dependents 
and marriage allowance may be withheld, and logistic support of the wife and the family may 
not be accepted,” and finally Japanese women would not be permitted entry into Australia as 
wives or as fiancées to BCOF troops.39   
Any marriages between troops and Japanese women happened in secrecy and through 
Shinto rites and rituals. However, the legal legitimacy of these weddings was at times 
questionable for BCOF troops. In John Arthur’s memoirs he mentions a BCOF officer, John 
Henderson, who married a Japanese woman, Mary Kasahi Abe, through Shinto rites. However, 
Henderson feared that the marriage held no legal legitimacy when she fell pregnant with their 
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daughter. Henderson then asked for the battalion chaplain to conduct another ceremony. This 
confession caused Henderson to be forced to return to Australia and was not allowed to see his 
wife for the fear that he would abandon his duties for the BCOF. This was a technique used by 
the BCOF in order to cut off the fraternisation entirely. However, Henderson did continue to 
fight from Australia to be reunited with Mary and their child. His parents supported his plight, 
yet this behaviour was responded to negatively by other members of the Australian public as 
shown through an anonymous letter to Henderson’s mother (Jessie Henderson) which accused 
her of “betraying Australian womanhood.”40 In an interview with The Mail, she commented 
that “we [herself and her husband] have always been highly thought of in this district, and now 
a few people are turning very nasty.”41 Despite this Henderson’s mother believed that there 
was room for the acceptance of the Japanese people in Australia and was reported saying “if 
Johnny can find it in his heart to forgive … anyone should.”42 Mrs Jessie Henderson’s attitude 
towards the Japanese, through her son’s love for his wife, was reflective of many BCOF 
members who fraternised with Japanese citizens. However, as evident from her neighbour’s 
reception of the idea of a Japanese war bride, many in Australia were not impressed with the 
idea that the BCOF were fraternising with the Japanese to the extent of marriage.  
As with most aspects of fraternisation with the BCOF, Australian newspapers reported 
on the rumours of troops marrying Japanese women. There were reports in the later part of the 
occupation on those BCOF soldiers who, like Henderson, had been discharged to Australia and 
forced to leave their wives behind. Army Minster Chambers believed that soldiers who were 
interviewed in these newspapers were trying to find support from Australians by contacting the 
media and that he was disgusted “to think that their eagerness to get back to their ‘wives’ in 
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Japan would gain even the slightest support in Australia.”43 One of these troops was twenty-
three-year-old Keith Morrison who said that he would do whatever he could to return to Japan 
in different newspaper articles. Morrison and other BCOF members argued that they had been 
“shanghaied” from their Japanese brides. Specifically, Morrison stated that while he felt no 
compassion for the Japanese he loved his wife whom he described as “a lovely girl, trustworthy, 
and an ideal wife.”44 In the same article he believed that “for every man on the Duntroon who 
has been returned to Australia for having a wife, or a de facto wife, there will be three [more 
men] on the next ship to come back.”45 Morrison also noted that he refused to offer the identity 
of his wife in the fear that “she would be picked up by BCOF provost, put into gaol for a day 
or two, forced to submit to medical examinations and finally handed over to the Japanese 
police.”46 Morrison was reported to have stowed away on a ship to Japan after he was denied 
legal access to return to Japan and lived in hiding with his wife for up to six months before 
being discovered.47 The determination of these troops displays how fraternisation was not a 
simple act for some in the BCOF, as well as the fact that in its display to the Australian public 
it was made clear that perceptions of the Japanese were subject to change.  
Despite these personal displays of affection, it was ultimately up to the government to 
decide whether these Japanese war brides would be able to come to Australia. The Minister of 
Immigration, Arthur Calwell, disliked the Japanese and wished to ban war brides from coming 
to Australia. Despite the fact that it seemed fraternisation was in favour for Australian-Japanese 
relations, Calwell still sided with the opinion of the public and stated that “no Australian mother 
whose devoted son … lies buried in some Pacific battle field, will have her feelings outraged 
by an Australian flaunting a Japanese woman before her … while relatives remain of men who 
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suffered at the hands of the Japanese, it would be the grossest act of public indecency to permit 
a Japanese of either sex to pollute Australian shores.” 48 However, as Tamura points out, 
Australia wished to have a good economic relationship with Japan through trade. Whatever 
was said or thought about the Japanese women was not as important as establishing trade 
relations, especially in exporting wool to Japan.49 It was in the month before the official signing 
of the Peace Treaty with Japan that Australia’s new Minister of Immigration, Harold Holt, 
allowed these brides to come to Australia. Holt expected only a dozen Japanese women to 
arrive. However, a total of 650 women arrived in Australia on  
“bride ships”. 50  This number alone can only signify the magnitude of more serious and 
deliberate fraternisation taking place during the occupation. It also showed that while some 
marriages, such as Henderson’s, were punished, a large proportion of BCOF and Japanese 
couples were left unnoticed. Arthur described the ultimate reception of these mixed marriages 
as a “head in the sand exercise” for BCOF administration.51  
Some of these marriages, especially those couples who successfully were able to live in 
Australia, influenced and outlived the stringency of Australia’s White Australia Policy.52 The 
Australian War Memorial’s depiction of the BCOF, using the image of F. Franklin and Morita 
Setsuko on their wedding day, as pictured below, displays the positive impact this form of 
fraternisation had over Australia. Not only were these successful marriages a testimony to 
fraternisation but also showed the changing demographic of Australia’s society at the turn of 
the twentieth century.   
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Figure 5: F. Franklin and Morita Setsuko at their wedding ceremony in 195253 
 
4.3 OTHER FORMS OF FRATERNISATION 
Sexual intercourse, marriage and business transactions were the more prevalent types of 
fraternisation and the most reported on, by both the Australian media and those officers who 
have published their memoirs. However, there were numerous other forms of fraternisation 
throughout the occupation. After all, the BCOF was dealing with an entire population of 
civilians from numerous ways of life, occupation and age and their time with the Japanese 
could be either peaceful or hostile. Positive relationships were developed with those Japanese 
involved in BCOF employment, who spent their time at work surrounded by troops with the 
ability to fraternise without any serious discipline. This included the house girls who worked 
intimately with the BCOF and their families. Some forms of fraternisation were ironically 
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instigated through clubs and amenities, things originally aimed to negate fraternisation. 
Fraternisation with clubs and amenities could, at times, develop life-long friendships. BCOF 
troop Clement Govett developed many friendships on his travels with the BCOF Tourist Club, 
which are now recorded in his archives. However, not all interactions were peaceful. There 
were hostile forms of fraternisation that can be cited by Alan Clifton, who remembers how 
some BCOF troops were considered barbarians for their horrible behaviour towards the 
Japanese. These troops reflected the reason Northcott developed the personal instruction on 
fraternisation, in fear of hostile fraternisation.  
As mentioned in the last chapter, Japanese civilians in the Kure area worked closely with 
the BCOF. Initially, this was because the BCOF needed help in ensuring that amenities were 
available for BCOF troops. However, the Japanese continued to be employed for numerous 
reasons within the BCOF for the rest of the occupation. In one document, titled Employment of 
Japanese Labour from January 31, 1948 the jobs of Japanese employees were listed which 
included both labour and domestic jobs. Labour-related jobs included interpreters, clerks, 
typists and officer workers and general labour. 54  Domestic purposes, which were more 
common for Japanese citizens to be employed in included cooks, kitchen help, mess stewards 
and waitresses, laundry personnel and houseboys or girls.55 Following these lists, the document 
states that “personnel in charge of Japanese labour will confine conversation to direction and 
matters affecting their work. Other personnel will not converse with labourers during their 
work hours.”56 This showed that while the BCOF and the Japanese were in close contact as 
essentially co-workers, BCOF administration wanted to try and avoid fraternisation at any cost. 
However, Green believed that “there were many opportunities to deal with the Japanese on a 
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one-to-one basis without transgressing the General’s guidelines.” 57  This was proven in 
particular by those Japanese employed in domestic BCOF jobs.  
 
Figure 6: This image displays Japanese civilian typists working for the BCOF in 1951, the inclusion of both male and 
female Japanese workers was common and allowed for different forms of fraternisation to occur.58 
 
House girls were a group of Japanese women employed by the BCOF, who worked as 
maids to the BCOF and their families. Inder wrote to his mother about the house girls he had 
work for him and wrote about them. A house girl named Muriosen “(or something)” as Inder 
noted in his letter “scrubs the place out every morning and is neat and tidy herself which is 
something for a Japanese girl.”59 Another house girl, Yoriko, was taught by Inder to make the 
bed the same way that his mother did, including keeping his pyjamas neatly folded beneath his 
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pillow.60 House girls ranged in age and different forms of fraternisation developed around this. 
In some instances, younger women would enter relationships with BCOF troops, sometimes 
leading to marriage. The older women, on the other hand “nagged and scolded the untidy habits 
and drinking of those young men just as they did their own sons.”61 The dynamics of the 
relationship of troops with the Japanese employees surrounding them at times would exceed 
the expected boundaries and become something of friendship. In BCOF Bound, instructions on 
the management of servants for housewives of the BCOF showed another form of 
fraternisation, this time with BCOF family members. As house girls were untrained it was up 
to the wives of the BCOF to train them. Due to there being a limited number of interpreters the 
wives were asked to use Japanese phrase books to communicate.62 This placed the families of 
BCOF officers in intimate situations with the Japanese. While wives were instructed that “all 
your dealings must be fair but firm,” this was, in its own way, fraternisation outside of 
Northcott’s personal instruction.63 
                                                     
60 Inder, Stuart. Stuart Inder to Mother, October 6, 1946. Letter. Series MLMSS 10017 (10), p. 2, State Library 
of NSW, Stuart Inder Papers 
61 Tamura, Michi’s Memories, 8–9. 
62 British Commonwealth Occupation Force BCOF Bound: For the Women and Children of the British 
Commonwealth Forces in Japan, Japan, 1946 found in Australian National Maritime Museum, Vaughan Evans 
Library, 952.044 BCO, Sydney, Australia. p. 22 
63 Ibid., 23. 
81 
 
 
Figure 7: This image depicts Mrs Greenfield (left) with a Japanese servant preparing dinner. Another picture of Mrs 
Greenfield found in the Australian War Memorial shows her with the same servant.64 
 
Expanding on the relationships with those Japanese under the employment of the BCOF, 
there was a rule against giving gifts to the Japanese. However, Arthur doubted that there was 
anybody who did not, at some point in time, give a gift to a Japanese citizen. One example 
Arthur recalls during his time in Japan was when an officer of ‘high character’ bought a dress 
for his house girl as a Christmas present. The officer, whose name Arthur does not disclose in 
his memoir, spoke openly of this breach.65 The fact that officers of high status would discuss 
this type of fraternisation showed that gift-giving treated as strictly as what was perceived as 
illegal, such as black-market operations and intercourse with . Arthur notes that this case was 
only reported as a provost officer had ironically been trying to purchase the exact same dress 
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for his wife, only to be told it had been sold out. The provost officer therefore reported him, 
however, nothing came of the matter.  
Some BCOF members developed strong friendships with Japanese citizens and through 
friendships and their wider experiences in the BCOF, found a fondness for the country. An 
example of this is the BCOF soldier Clement N. Govett. Govett’s experiences in the BCOF 
display the positive experiences of BCOF soldiers in the occupation and through this his 
fraternisation and strong relationships with the Japanese. In one of his memoirs, which he 
entitles Journey to Japan, he described himself as being “single at the time with the rank of Sgt 
and used to spend [his] off duty time moving around the BCOF Area on [his] own.”66 Govett 
joined the BCOF Tourist Club, a “group of interested persons who, under the auspices of the 
Army Education Service, moved around the Kure/Hiroshima sightseeing at weekends.”67 As 
was the goal of establishing other clubs, this was to keep BCOF troops occupied and lower the 
chances of fraternisation. Govett explains in Journey to Japan that what he has recorded in the 
pages was his adventures with this club in between his routine work for the BCOF. In his 
adventures with the BCOF Tourist Club, Govett describes peaceful interactions with the 
Japanese. When they passed through small villages, Govett and his four friends that were a part 
of the club would be greeted by curious villagers. Govett writes about how “children flocked 
to see (us) and many sweets and candies were offered to them.”68 While Northcott’s personal 
instructions asked that the troops not interact with the Japanese outside of their duties, it is clear 
on their spare time and in their clubs, this was not true. Another example of simple, yet humble 
fraternisation and interaction with the Japanese is from one of Govett’s trips to Miyajima island 
off the coast of Hiroshima – where an old Japanese woman asked for one yen. Govett says that 
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“I gave her a ten yen note and walked on, however she came after me with nine one-yen 
notes.” 69  These are only two from Govett’s memoir, displaying how fraternisation with 
Japanese citizens was not only a common occurrence, but could be more positive in comparison 
to what the BCOF had first believed from Australian troops.70  
While the attitude of Australians towards Japan and its people began to soften during the 
occupation, there was still occurrences of hostile behaviour originally expected. Clifton Pugh, 
in discussing his time in the occupation described himself as such, “I was a typical occupying 
troop, would not have been a good ambassador for Australia. I don’t think any of us were. We 
spent our time getting pissed in the canteen and hell-raising around the joint. I don’t particularly 
want to go into that. I was a typical soldier.”71 This description, and the unwillingness to go 
into detail about events that may or may not have occurred during his time in Japan, showed 
that the BCOF troops did not all behave with respect and dignity, as Northcott asked of them 
in his personal instruction. While fraternisation can overall be argued to have a positive impact 
on the relationship between Australia and Japan, there were still BCOF troops that looked down 
upon the Japanese. These perceptions of the Japanese resulted in fraternisation of a hostile 
behaviour. According to Davies, from June to October of 1946 the most common crimes 
committed by the BCOF against Japanese citizens were robbery and theft, assault, traffic 
violations, rape and attempted rape, burglary and drunk and disorderly conduct. 72  Poor 
behaviour was not uncommon, as Pugh described it, hell-raising behaviour was that of a typical 
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soldier.73 As mentioned in the previous chapter, Australians were sometimes called Yabanjin, 
which means barbarian in Japanese for their poor bad behaviour towards the Japanese.74 
Clifton remembers the behaviour of some BCOF troops, from his personal experiences “that 
the Australians were the worst-behaved of all.”75 Clifton recalled the abuse of Japanese men 
and youths for the sheer joy of it, setting fire to brothels when refused entrance and the 
numerous robberies and rapes that took up the majority of Clifton’s memories. He stated that 
“crimes against the civil population had become so numerous that I was being called out almost 
every night by the Japanese police.”76  
 
Figure 8: The back of a Japanese civilian, displaying two wounds suspected of being inflicted by a BCOF officer.77 
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While many marriages between the BCOF and the Japanese flourished, there was also an 
amount that did not last through the occupation. As a result, children of these failed marriages 
were left fatherless or orphaned. Arthur noted that in 1960 it was reported the number of 
children with Australian fathers in Kure was at least 103, and that at least twenty per cent of 
orphans were reported to be the offspring of BCOF and Japanese marriages.78 As a way to 
create deniability about these children, the chief of the Supreme Allied Command of public 
health and welfare section said that “orphanages throughout Japan would continue to care for 
these children. Most of the orphanages were only half-full, and as illegitimacy was not so 
seriously regarded in Japan most of the Allied-Japanese children would be cared for by their 
mothers.”79 The issue of bi racial children towards the end of the occupation was debated often. 
Many of the mothers who were left to raise the children of occupation soldiers were rejected 
by society. Koikari stated that “controversies regarding the status of immoral women and bi 
racial children were ultimately about where national boundaries should be drawn.”80 
 Walter Hamilton, an ABC Tokyo correspondent, published a book of the oral histories 
of the children of BCOF troops in an analysis of race relations and immigration policy. The 
Australian government at the time anticipated that the public would “arouse the sympathy of 
families in a position to help,”81 when word of orphaned children with BCOF fathers was 
reported in newspaper articles in Australia. Hamilton continues in saying that “the Immigration 
Department imposed conditions that made inter-country adoption from Japan almost 
impossible. Disingenuous welfare and legal arguments were used to dress up a decision based 
principally on race.”82 In addition to race, gender would have also played a vital part to this 
decision making. The Australian government wished to hide these children from the Australian 
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public as not only was the issue of race still prevalent in Australia with the White Australian 
Policy still intact, but it was proof of the failure to stop fraternisation.  
Fraternisation occurred in numerous different ways throughout the BCOF’s occupation 
of Japan. The positive interactions show that these were perhaps the first instances of peace 
after a long war and would mirror future relations between Australia and Japan. On the other 
hand, fraternisation also occurred negatively, in the BCOF troops that would simply express 
anger because of Australia’s perceptions of the Japanese.  While these interactions had less of 
a lasting impact on Australian media, scholars or how BCOF troops reminisced on their time 
in Japan, they still show that fraternisation existed as a part of the occupation of Japan.  
4.4 ANALYSING THE FRATERNISATION POLICY 
By 1949, most BCOF occupation troops had returned home, with a total of 2,300 troops 
remaining in Japan.83 The British, Indian and New Zealand components of the BCOF all left 
in a time window from the end of 1948 and beginning of 1949.84 This left the BCOF as an 
Australian-only occupation group, give or take a few members. Ironically, this is what 
Australia had always wanted from the beginning. However, much had changed since the 
beginning of the occupation. In the three years that the BCOF had been operating in the 
occupation of Japan there had been both international political change and more importantly a 
shift in attitude towards the Japanese from within their ranks. In an article by Denis Warner, 
an A.A.P.-Reuter Correspondent, published in 1948, he describes that the “BCOF appears well 
fed, well housed, well-disciplined and well provided with official amenities.”85 He continued 
to say that, however, “it is bored by its surroundings, annoyed at the regimentation of its 
entertainment (plenty of sports grounds, for instance but no beer halls or dance halls), irritated 
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by anti-fraternisation regulations and desperately tired of endless routine guard duties.”86  Not 
only was fraternisation within the BCOF becoming a day to day experience for the troops and 
these policies limited their living experience, but in a political manner the environment of the 
occupation was changing in the escalation of Cold War politics for the United States and the 
battle on communism. This left BCOF administration with the choice to evaluate their 
fraternisation policy and change the way in which the BCOF were fraternising.  
The Cold War influenced America’s international relations and foreign policy to be 
modelled into a state of permanent military readiness.87 In order to achieve this within the Cold 
War, the United States needed more allies within the areas affected by communism, specifically 
East Asia and the Pacific. This created a shift in the occupation which changed the way in 
which the occupation treated Japan, forming the country into an ally rather than dulling the 
blade of a former enemy. W. Macmahon Ball, a former Australian Envoy in Japan noted in 
early 1948 that “during the next six months America will try to build Japan into the workshop 
of East Asia,”88 to develop its relationship and create a stronger barrier against the Soviet Union 
and communism. 
With political relationships developing in a peaceful way, it only seemed natural that 
friendship between the citizens of each country develop as well. In late 1949, Macarthur lifted 
almost all restrictions that limited “Friendly relations between the occupation forces and the 
Japanese people.”89 In Change No. 7 to SCAP Occupation Instruction No. 5, new instructions 
stated that “as the character of the occupation has gradually changed from stern rigidity of a 
military occupation to the friendly guidance of a protective force, henceforth the Occupation 
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Forces will … indoctrinate occupation personnel in an attitude of friendly interest and guidance 
towards indigenous peoples in conduct of occupation missions.”90 In all areas of the occupation 
controlled by the United States there was both freedom for the troops as well as the Japanese, 
as citizens could “visit service clubs and join in organised occupation social activities.”91  
In the face of America’s foreign policy shift, the BCOF administration was influenced to 
review their stance on fraternisation in 1949. The BCOF Administration discussed “whether 
there should be any changes in the existing policy regarding fraternisation with Japanese 
nationals by members of the British Commonwealth Occupation Force in Japan.” 92 
Commander in Chief, Robertson stated that he was in favour of relaxing the fraternisation 
policy in order to comply with MacArthur’s new stance on relations with the Japanese. He 
suggested that troops be able to visit Japanese households that had been deemed acceptable by 
the BCOF to allow for more friendly interactions between troops and the Japanese.93 The 
defence committee also agreed in favour of changing the fraternisation policy for a number of 
reasons, including that of Robertson’s recommendation and that “the time that has elapsed 
since the defeat of Japan and the changed character of the occupation of Japan in view of the 
demilitarisation of the country” has changed behaviour and perceptions of Japan and the 
Japanese. 94  Despite this show of support for a change in fraternisation policy, the Secretary 
of the Defence Committee responded on behalf of the Australian government: “The 
Government decided that there is to be no change in the existing policy of non-fraternisation 
between BCOF personnel and the Japanese.”95 This choice showed that while BCOF troops 
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(including Robertson) had softened in their view of the Japanese, the softening of attitudes in 
Canberra were considerably slower. The Australian government also sought to appease public 
outcries in Australia, who also still saw Japan as more of an enemy than friend. 
While this could have been the opportunity to develop aspects of fraternisation that had 
once been done in secrecy, such as marriage and some friendships, the Australian government 
decided against developing a new fraternisation policy.  However, this choice did not affect 
fraternisation within the occupation, which had occurred since the beginning of the occupation. 
4.5 CONCLUSION  
Other forms of fraternisation existed throughout the occupation and were both positive 
and negative. At the same time, these forms were also being placed on different levels of 
importance to the BCOF administration and Australian government, who concluded towards 
the end of the occupation that despite the changing environment of the occupation that the 
BCOF fraternisation policy should remain the same. The Black Market was an aspect of 
fraternisation considered seriously by the BCOF yet was solely economic in nature. Marriage 
to Japanese women, on the other hand tempted to challenge the future of Australia’s 
demographic if these war brides were accepted into Australia’s society after World War II. 
Other forms of fraternisation, such as friendship with employees or co-workers and gift giving 
were types of fraternisation that went on either ignored or unnoticed due to their innocent 
behaviour. The violent behaviour of occupation troops, on the other hand, displayed that 
fraternisation was not always peaceful or about relationships and could simply be about 
perceptions that Northcott had originally feared.  
No matter the importance to administration, or the positive or negative behaviour of the 
fraternisation, the allied occupation was thriving with fraternisation from start to finish beyond 
the idea of policy or not. 
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5 CONCLUSION 
This thesis has argued that fraternisation between the BCOF and the Japanese flourished 
throughout the Allied Occupation of Japan.  
It has discussed the origins and initial movements of the BCOF and paid attention to the 
BCOF’s strict anti-fraternisation policy. The BCOF was developed through a string of political 
discussions that focused on Australia’s desire to present itself as an influential power in the 
Pacific. This was aimed especially towards the United States, which had become Australia’s 
strongest ally in World War II. However, the establishment of the BCOF under Australian 
command was a long process which caused some BCOF soldiers to wait almost six months 
until they entered Japan for active duty. It was due to this and the negative perception of Japan 
by Australians that Commander in Chief, John Northcott developed a personal statement that 
has been described by historians such as Kovner as the strictest fraternisation policy of the 
Allied Occupation. 
It stated that BCOF troops must remain dignified and keep their interactions with the 
Japanese to a minimum to represent the Commonwealth properly. To do this, the BCOF 
administration put in place numerous different amenities and techniques to discourage 
fraternisation. However, due to poor organisation and lack of standard living conditions the 
BCOF troops fraternised outside of their duties. One of the most common forms of 
fraternisation involved the , a group of Japanese sex workers. Sexual fraternisation was a 
serious issue for not only the BCOF but the entire Allied Occupation force. This form of 
fraternisation led to an epidemic of venereal disease in countless troops and as recorded data 
showed in this thesis, sexual fraternisation was a consistent form of fraternisation throughout 
the occupation, especially among Australian troops.  
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Fraternisation occurred in numerous ways, such as the black market, marriage and more. 
This example showed that not all fraternisation was related to a sexual connection. In 
comparison, marriage showed what could happen when fraternisation led to love, at which 
would in theory lead to a life time commitment past the years of the occupation. Other forms 
of fraternisation that existed, such as friendships made between BCOF and Japanese 
employees, exhibited different forms of fraternisation that were constant throughout the 
occupation. While it seemed that perceptions of the Japanese were evolving and developing 
within the occupation forces, this was not so for the Australian government in Canberra. The 
decision not to make changes to the BCOF fraternisation policy by the Australian government 
in 1949 showed that despite the constant appearance of fraternisation, the influences of World 
War II still plagued the minds of many in Australia’s political sphere. However, the 
fraternisation policy had never stopped BCOF troops from fraternising and troops would 
continue to do so until the end of the occupation.  
In conclusion, when the decision was made to withdraw the last of the Australian troops 
from Japan, MacArthur cabled the Prime Minister of Australia with these final words on the 
BCOF:  
“In deepest sincerity, I shall greatly regret the severing of my contact with your 
troops. Their discipline, their conduct and their bearing have all on occasions, 
and in all circumstances been exemplary. Australia can be proud of what they 
have done here.”1 
This begs the question of “What had the Australians done during their time in Allied 
Occupation Japan?” From what has been discussed in this thesis, the Australian troops of the 
BCOF did more than they were required in ways that the BCOF Administration did not expect. 
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While demilitarisation and democratisation were the basic goals of the Allied Occupation of 
Japan, the BCOF troops managed to develop relationships with the Japanese on a human level. 
The Japanese, a people once perceived by Australians as blood thirsty, had become lovers, co-
workers, friends and business partners. At times, troops and Japanese citizens remained 
enemies. However, the relationships between Australia and Japan was transformed through the 
fraternisation that occurred in the Allied Occupation.  
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